Decentralized linear quadratic systems with major and minor agents and non-Gaussian noise

Mohammad Afshari, *Student Member, IEEE,* and Aditya Mahajan, *Senior Member, IEEE*

Abstract—We consider a decentralized linear quadratic system with a major agent and a collection of minor agents. The agents are coupled in their dynamics as well as cost. In particular, the dynamics are linear; the state and control action of the major agent affect the state evolution of all the minor agents but the state and the control action of the minor agents do not affect the state evolution of the major or other minor agents. The cost is an arbitrarily coupled quadratic cost. The system has partial output feedback with partially nested information structure. In particular, the major agent perfectly observes its own state while each minor agent perfectly observes the state of the major agent and partially observes its own state. It is *not* assumed that the noise process has a Gaussian distribution. For this model, we characterize the structure of the optimal and the best linear strategies. We show that the optimal control of the major agent is a linear function of the major agent's MMSE (minimum mean squared error) estimate of the system state and the optimal control of a minor agent is a linear function of the major agent's MMSE estimate of the system state and a "correction term" which depends on the difference of the minor agent's MMSE estimate of its local state and the major agent's MMSE estimate of the minor agent's local state. The major agent's MMSE estimate is a linear function of its observations while the minor agent's MMSE estimate is a non-linear function of its observations which is updated according to the non-linear Bayesian filter. We show that if we replace the minor agent's MMSE estimate by its LLMS (linear least mean square) estimate, then the resultant strategy is the best linear control strategy. We prove the result using a direct proof which is based on conditional independence of the states of the minor agents given the common information, splitting of the state and control actions based on the common information, and simplifying the per-step cost based on conditional independence, orthogonality principle, and completion of squares.

Index Terms—Decentralized stochastic control, decentralized linear quadratic systems, dynamic team theory, non-Gaussian noise, separation of estimation and control.

I. INTRODUCTION

In many modern decentralized control systems such as self driving cars, robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, and others, the environment is sensed using vision and Lidar sensors; the raw sensor observations are filtered through a deep neural network based object classifier and the classifier outputs are used as the inputs to the controllers. In such systems the assumption that the observation noise is Gaussian breaks down. Therefore, the optimal design of such decentralized systems requires understanding the structure of optimal controllers when the observation noise is non-Gaussian.

The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McGill University, Montreal, QC, H3A-0E9, Canada. Emails: mohammad.afshari2@mail.mcgill.ca, aditya.mahajan@mcgill.ca

For centralized control of linear systems with quadratic per-step cost, the classical two way separation between estimation and control continues to hold even when the observation (and the process noises) are non-Gaussian. In particular, the optimal control action is a linear function of the MMSE (minimum mean-squared error) estimator of the state given the observations and the past actions at the controller. Moreover, the MMSE estimator does not depend on the choice of the control strategy. See [1]–[3] for details.

Although the optimal control action is a linear function of the MMSE estimate, the MMSE estimate is, in general, a non-linear function of the past observations and actions. Thus, the optimal control action is a non-linear function of the past observations and the action. In certain applications, it is desirable to restrict attention to linear control strategies. The best linear strategy is similar to the optimal strategy where the MMSE estimate is replaced by the LLMS (linear least mean squares) estimate.[1] Moreover, the LLMS estimate does not depend on the choice of the control strategy. See [4, section 15.5.3] for details.

In summary, in centralized control of linear quadratic systems with non-Gaussian noise, there is a two way separation of estimation and control; the optimal control action is a linear function of the MMSE estimate of the state given the data at the controller. The best linear controller has the same structure except the MMSE estimate of the state is replaced by the LLMS estimate. Both the MMSE and LLMS estimators can be computed as functions of sufficient statistics that can be recursively updated.[2] In contrast, the current state of the art in decentralized systems is significantly limited.

In the literature on optimal decentralized control of linear quadratic systems, most papers assume that the noise processes are Gaussian. Even with Gaussian noise, non-linear policies may outperform the best linear policies [5]; linear strategies are globally optimal only for specific information structures (e.g., partially nested [6] and its variants). Even for systems with Gaussian noise and partially nested information structures, there is no general method to identify sufficient statistics for the optimal controller; the optimal strategy is known to have a finite-dimensional sufficient statistic only for specific models (e.g., the one-step delayed sharing information structure [7], [8]; asymmetric one-step delayed sharing [9]; chain structures [10]; two-agent problem [11]). As far as we are aware, there are no existing results on sufficient statistics for optimal decentralized

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[1]For linear models driven by uncorrelated noise, the LLMS estimate is the best linear unbiased estimator of the state.

[2]MMSE estimator is the mean of the conditional density, which can be recursively updated via Bayesian filtering; LLMS estimator can be recursively updated via recursive least squares filtering.

control of linear quadratic systems with output feedback and non-Gaussian noise.

If attention is restricted to linear strategies, the problem of finding the best linear control strategy for a decentralized linear quadratic system is not convex in general but can be converted to a convex problem when the controller and the plant have specific sparsity pattern (funnel causality [12], quadratic invariance [13], and their variants). Even for such models, the best linear control strategy may not have a finite dimensional sufficient statistic [14]; the best linear strategy is known to have a finite-dimensional sufficient statistic only for specific models (e.g., poset causality [15], two-agent problem [16]–[23] and its variants [24]–[26]). A general method for identifying sufficient statistics for the best linear strategy in linear quadratic systems with partial history sharing was proposed in [27], but this method did not provide an efficient algorithm to compute all the gains at the controllers.

In this paper, we investigate a decentralized control system with a major agent and a collection of minor agents. The agents are coupled in their dynamics as well as cost. In particular, the dynamics are linear; the state and the control actions of the major agent affect the state evolution of all the minor agents but the state and control actions of the minor agents do not affect the state evolution of the major or other minor agents. The cost is an arbitrarily coupled quadratic cost. The information structure is partially nested with partial output feedback. In particular, the major agent perfectly observes its own state while each minor agent perfectly observes the state of the major agent and partially observes its own state. We assume that the process and the observation noises have zero mean and finite variance but do not impose any restrictions on the distribution of the noise processes. We are interested in identifying both the optimal and the best linear control strategy for this model.

There are two motivations for considering this specific model. First, such systems arise in certain applications in decentralized control of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and for that reason there has been considerable interest in understanding special cases of such models [16]–[26]. Variations of this model with weak coupling between the agents have also been considered in the literature on mean-field games [28]–[31]. Second, the information structure may be viewed as a "star network", where the major agent is the central hub and the minor agents are on the periphery. Understanding the optimal design of such systems is an important intermediate step in understanding the optimal design of decentralized systems where agents are connected over a general graph.

Even though the information structure of our model is partially nested, we cannot use the results of [6] because the noise processes are not Gaussian. Although there is information that is commonly known to all agents in our model, the information structure is not partial history sharing [32] because the local information at the minor agents is increasing with time. Hence, we can neither directly use the common information approach of [32] to obtain a dynamic programming decompositions nor can we use the method of [27] to identify sufficient statistics.

When there is only one minor agent, our model is similar to the two agent problem considered in [11], [16]–[21], [23]. However, none of these results are directly applicable: [16]–[18] restrict attention to state feedback; [20], [21], [23] consider output or partial output feedback in continuous time systems but restrict attention to linear feedback strategies; [11] considers output feedback but assumes that the noise is Gaussian. A model similar to ours has been considered in [19], [26]. In [26], a continuous time system with major and minor agents with output feedback is considered but it is assumed that there is no cost coupling between the minor agents, the system dynamics is stable, and attention is restricted to linear strategies. In [19], a discrete time system with a major and a single minor agent is considered but it is assumed that the system dynamics is stable and attention is restricted to linear strategies.

Our first main result is to show that the qualitative features of centralized control of linear quadratic control continue to hold for decentralized control of linear systems with major and minor agents. In particular, we show that:

- The optimal control action of the major agent is a linear function of the major agent's MMSE estimate of the state of the entire system. The corresponding gains are determined by the solution of a single "global" Riccati equation that depends on the dynamics and the cost of the entire system.
- The optimal control action of the minor agent is a linear function of the minor agent's MMSE estimate of its local state and the major agent's MMSE estimate of the local state of the minor agent. The corresponding gains are determined by the solution of two Riccati equation: a "global" Riccati equation that depends on the dynamics and the cost of the entire system and a "local" Riccati equation that depends on the dynamics and the cost of the minor agent.

Moreover, the MMSE estimate of both the major and the minor agents do not depend on the choice of the control strategy. Thus, there is a two-way separation between estimation and control. See Theorem 2 for a precise statement of these results. Note that the MMSE estimator of the major agent is a linear function of the data while the MMSE estimator of the minor agent is a non-linear function of the data.

Our second main result is to show that the best linear strategy has the same structure as the optimal strategy where the MMSE estimate is replaced by the LLMS estimate. Moreover, the LLMS estimate does not depend on the choice of the control strategy.

We show that both the MMSE and the LLMS estimates can be computed as a function of sufficient statistics that can be updated recursively. In particular, we show that the MMSE estimate at the minor agent is the mean of the conditional density of the state of the minor agent given the past observations. The conditional density can be recursively updated using (non-linear) Bayesian filtering. The LLMS estimates at the minor agent can be updated using recursive least squares filtering. Note that unlike the results of [11], [23], the recursive update of both the MMSE and the LLMS estimates do not depend on the Riccati gains.

Finally, we believe that our proof technique might be considered a contribution in its own right. The two most commonly

used techniques in decentralized control of linear systems are: (i) time-domain dynamic programming decomposition which is used to identify optimal strategies; and (ii) frequency domain decomposition using Youla parameterization which is used to identify the best linear control strategy. In this paper, we present a unified approach to identify both the optimal and the best linear control strategies. Our approach is based on: (i) conditional independence of the states of the minor agents given the common information; and (ii) splitting the state and the control actions based on the common information; and (iii) simplifying the per-step cost based on conditional independence, orthogonality principle, and completion of squares. Our approach side steps the technical difficulties related to measurability and existence of value functions in dynamic programming. At the same time, unlike the spectral factorization methods, it can be used to identify both the optimal and the best linear control strategy. Given the paucity of positive results in decentralized control, we believe that a new solution approach is of interest.

A. Notation

Given a matrix A, A_{ij} denotes its (i,j)-th block element, $A^\intercal$ denotes its transpose, $\mathrm{vec}(A)$ denotes the column vector of A formed by vertically stacking the columns of A. Given a square matrix A, $\mathrm{Tr}(A)$ denotes the sum of its diagonal elements. I_n denotes an $n \times n$ identity matrix. We simply use I when the dimension is clear for context. Given any vector valued process $\{y(t)\}_{t \geq 1}$ and any time instances t_1, t_2 such that $t_1 \leq t_2$, $y(t_1{:}t_2)$ is a short hand notation for $\mathrm{vec}(y(t_1), y(t_1 + 1), \ldots, y(t_2))$.

Given random vectors x, y, and z, $\mathbb{E}[x]$ denotes the mean of x, $\mathbb{E}[x|y]$ denotes the conditional mean of random variable x given random variable y, $\mathrm{cov}(x,y)$ denotes the covariance between x and y, and $x \perp\!\!\!\perp y|z$ denotes that x and y are conditionally independent given z.

Superscript index agents and local, common, and stochastic components of state and control. Subscripts denote components of vectors and matrices. The notation $\hat{x}(t|i)$ denotes the estimate of variable x at time t conditioned on the information available at agent i at time t.

Given matrices A, B, C, Q, R, Σ, Σ', and P of appropriate dimensions, we use the following operators:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{R}(P, A, B, Q, R) &= Q + A^\intercal P A \\
&\quad - A^\intercal P B (R + B^\intercal P B)^{-1} B^\intercal P A, \\
\mathcal{G}(P, A, B, R) &= (R + B^\intercal P B)^{-1} B^\intercal P A. \\
\mathcal{K}(P, A, C, \Sigma, \Sigma') &= (A P A^\intercal C^\intercal + \Sigma C^\intercal) \\
&\quad (C A P C^\intercal A^\intercal + C \Sigma C + \Sigma')^{-1},
\end{aligned}
$$

and

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{F}(P, A, C, \Sigma, \Sigma') &= A P A^\intercal + \Sigma \\
&\quad - K (C A P A^\intercal C^\intercal + C \Sigma C + \Sigma') K^\intercal,
\end{aligned}
$$

where $K = \mathcal{K}(P, A, C, \Sigma, \Sigma')$.

II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Problem formulation

Consider a decentralized control system with one major and n minor agents that evolves in discrete time over a finite horizon T. We use index 0 to indicate the major agent and use index i, $i \in N := \{1, \ldots, n\}$, to indicate a minor agent. We also define $N_0 := \{0, 1, \ldots, n\}$ as the set of all agents. Let $x_i(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{d_x^i}$ and $u_i(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{d_u^i}$ denote the state and control input of agent $i \in N_0$.

1) System dynamics: All agents have linear dynamics. The dynamics of the major agent is not affected by the minor agents. In particular, the initial state of the major agent is given by $x_0(1)$, and for $t \geq 1$, the state of the major agent evolves according to

$$
x_0(t + 1) = A_{00} x_0(t) + B_{00} u_0(t) + w_0(t), \quad (1)
$$

where $\{w_0(t)\}_{t \geq 1}$, $w_0(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{d_x^0}$, is a noise process.

In contrast, the dynamics of the minor agents are affected by the state of the major agent. For agent $i \in N$, the initial state is given by $x_i(1)$, and for $t \geq 1$, the state evolves according to

$$
x_i(t+1) = A_{ii} x_i(t) + A_{i0} x_0(t) + B_{ii} u_i(t) + B_{i0} u_0(t) + w_i(t), \quad (2)
$$

where $\{w_i(t)\}_{t \geq 1}$, $w_i(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{d_x^i}$, is a noise process. Furthermore, the minor agent $i \in N$ generates an output $y_i(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{d_y^i}$ given by

$$
y_i(t) = C_{ii} x_i(t) + v_i(t) \quad i \in N, \quad (3)
$$

where $\{v_i(t)\}_{t \geq 1}$, $v_i(t) \in \mathbb{R}^{d_y^i}$, is a noise process.

Assumption 1 We assume that all primitive random variables—the initial states $\{x_0(1), x_1(1), \ldots, x_n(1)\}$, the process noises $\{w_0(1), \ldots, w_i(T)\}_{i \in N_0}$, and the observation noises $\{v_i(1), \ldots, v_i(T)\}_{i \in N}$ are independent and have zero mean and finite variance. We use Σ_i^x to denote the variance of the initial state $x_i(1)$, Σ_i^w to denote the variance of the process noise $w_i(t)$ and Σ_i^v to denote the variance of the observation noise $v_i(t)$.

Note that we do not assume that the primitive random variables have a Gaussian distribution.

Let $x(t) = \mathrm{vec}(x_0(t), \ldots, x_n(t))$ denote the state of the system, $u(t) = \mathrm{vec}(u_0(t), \ldots, u_n(t))$ denote the control actions of all controllers, and $w(t) = \mathrm{vec}(w_0(t), \ldots, w_n(t))$ denote the system disturbance. Then the dynamics (1) and (2) can be written in vector form as

$$
x(t + 1) = A x(t) + B u(t) + w(t), \quad (4)
$$

where

$$
A = \begin{bmatrix}
A_{00} & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
A_{10} & A_{11} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
A_{20} & 0 & A_{22} & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\
A_{n0} & 0 & \cdots & 0 & A_{nn}
\end{bmatrix}
$$

and

$$
B = \begin{bmatrix}
B_{00} & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
B_{10} & B_{11} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
B_{20} & 0 & B_{22} & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & \vdots \\
B_{n0} & 0 & \cdots & 0 & B_{nn}
\end{bmatrix}.
$$

Note that A and B are sparse block lower triangular matrices.

2) Information structure: The system has partial output feedback: the major agent observes its own state while minor agent i, $i \in N$, observes the state of the major agent and its own output. Thus, the information $I_0(t)$ available to the major agent is given by

$$ I_0(t) := \{x_0(1{:}t), u_0(1{:}t-1)\}, \tag{5} $$

while the information $I_i(t)$ available to minor agent i, $i \in N$, is given by

$$ I_i(t) := \{x_0(1{:}t), y_i(1{:}t), u_0(1{:}t-1), u_i(1{:}t-1)\}. \tag{6} $$

3) Admissible control strategies: At time t, controller $i \in N_0$ chooses control action $u_i(t)$ as a function of the information $I_i(t)$ available to it, i.e.,

$$ u_i(t) = g_{i,t}(I_i(t)), \quad i \in N_0. $$

The function $g_{i,t}$ is called the control law of controller i, $i \in N_0$, at time t. The collection $g_i := (g_{i,1}, \ldots, g_{i,T})$ is called the control strategy of controller i and $(g_0, \ldots, g_n)$ is called the control strategy of the system.

We consider two classes of control strategies. The first, which we call *general control strategies* and denote by $\mathscr{G}$, is where $g_{i,t}$ is a measurable function that maps $I_i(t)$ to $u_i(t)$. The second, which we call *affine control strategies* and denote by $\mathscr{G}_A$, is where $g_{i,t}$ is an affine function that maps $I_i(t)$ to $u_i(t)$.

4) System performance and control objective: At time $t \in \{1, \ldots, T-1\}$, the system incurs a per-step cost of

$$ c(x(t), u(t)) = x(t)^\mathsf{T} Q x(t) + u(t)^\mathsf{T} R u(t) \tag{7} $$

and at the time T, the system incurs a terminal cost of

$$ C(x(T)) = x^\mathsf{T}(T) Q_T x(T). \tag{8} $$

It is assumed that Q and Q_T are positive semi-definite and R is positive definite.

The performance of any strategy $(g_0, \ldots, g_n)$ is given by

$$ J(g_0, \ldots, g_n) = \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{T} c(x(t), u(t)) + C(x(T)) \right], \tag{9} $$

where the expectation is with respect to the joint measure on all the system variables induced by the choice of the strategy $(g_0, \ldots, g_n) \in \mathcal{G}$.

We are interested in the following optimization problems.

Problem 1 In the system described above, choose a general control strategy $(g_0, \ldots, g_n) \in \mathscr{G}$ to minimize the total expected cost given by (9).

The information structure of the model is partially nested [6], but the noise is not Gaussian. So we cannot assert that there is no loss of optimality in restricting attention to linear strategies.

In fact, our main result shows that the optimal policy of Problem 1 is non-linear. In certain applications, it is desirable to restrict attention to linear strategies. For that reason, we also consider the following optimization problem.

Problem 2 In the system described above, choose an affine strategy $(g_0, \ldots, g_n) \in \mathscr{G}_A$ to minimize the total expected cost given by (9).

B. Roadmap of the solution approach

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section III we present several preliminary results to simplify the analysis. These include a common-information based splitting of state and control actions, a static reduction of the information structure, and establishing conditional independence of the various components of the state. We combine these results to split the per-step cost and then use completion of squares to rewrite the total cost as sum of three terms: the first depends on the common component of the state and control action, the second depends on the local component of the state and control action, and the third depends on the stochastic component of the state. A key feature of this decomposition is that the third term does not depend on the choice of the control strategy. So we can focus on the first two terms to find the optimal or the best linear strategy.

Our next step is to use orthogonal projection to simplify the first two terms. In Section IV, we simplify these terms using orthogonality blueproperties of the MMSE estimate and the estimation error; in Section V, we simplify these terms using orthogonality properties of LLMS estimate and the estimation error. The final expression of the total cost in both cases is such that the optimal and best linear strategies can be identified by inspection.

III. PRELIMINARY RESULTS

A. Common information based state and control splitting

Following [32], we split the information at each agent into common and local information. The common information is defined as:

$$ I^c(t) := \bigcap_{i \in N_0} I_i(t) = \{x_0(1{:}t), u_0(1{:}t-1)\} = I_0(t). \tag{10} $$

The local information is the remaining information at each agent. Thus,

$$ I_0^\ell(t) := I_0(t) \setminus I^c(t) = \emptyset, \tag{11a} $$
$$ I_i^\ell(t) := I_i(t) \setminus I^c(t) = \{y_i(1{:}t), u_i(1{:}t-1)\}. \tag{11b} $$

Thus, although there is common information among the agents, the system *does not* have partially history sharing information structure [32] because the local information at agent $i \in N$ is increasing with time. Hence the approach of [27], [32] cannot be used directly.

Instead, we combine the idea of common information with a standard idea in linear systems and split the state and the control actions into different components based on the

common information. First, we split the control action into two components: $u(t) = u^c(t) + u^\ell(t)$, where

$$u^c(t) = \mathbb{E}[u(t)|I^c(t)], \qquad u^\ell(t) = u(t) - u^c(t). \quad (12)$$

We refer to $u^c(t)$ and $u^\ell(t)$ as the common control and the local control, respectively.

Based on the above splitting of control actions, we split the state into three components: $x(t) = x^c(t) + x^\ell(t) + x^s(t)$, where

$$x^c(1) = 0, \qquad x^c(t+1) = Ax^c(t) + Bu^c(t), \quad (13a)$$
$$x^\ell(1) = 0, \qquad x^\ell(t+1) = Ax^\ell(t) + Bu^\ell(t), \quad (13b)$$
$$x^s(1) = x(1), \qquad x^s(t+1) = Ax^s(t) + w(t). \quad (13c)$$

We refer to $x^c(t)$, $x^\ell(t)$, $x^s(t)$ as the common, local, and stochastic components of the state, respectively. Note that the stochastic component is control free (i.e., does not depend on the control actions).

Based on the above splitting of state, we split the observations of agent $i \in N$ into three components as well: $y_i(t) = y_i^c(t) + y_i^\ell(t) + y_i^s(t)$, where

$$y_i^c(t) = C_{ii}x_i^c(t), \quad (14a)$$
$$y_i^\ell(t) = C_{ii}x_i^\ell(t), \quad (14b)$$
$$y_i^s(t) = C_{ii}x_i^s(t) + v_i(t). \quad (14c)$$

We refer to $y_i^c(t)$, $y_i^\ell(t)$, and $y_i^s(t)$ as the common, local, and stochastic components of the observation, respectively. Note that since $x_i^s(t)$ is control free, so is $y_i^s(t)$.

Lemma 1 *For any strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}$ the split components of the state and the control actions satisfy the following properties:*
(P1) $u_0^\ell(t) = 0$.

(P2) $x_0^\ell(t) = 0$.

(P3) $\mathbb{E}[u^c(t)^\intercal M u^\ell(t)] = 0$, *where M is any matrix of compatible dimensions.*

(P4) $\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)|I^c(t)] = 0, i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$.

(P5) $\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)] = 0, i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$.

(P6) $\mathbb{E}[x^c(t)|I^c(t)] = x^c(t)$.

The proof is presented in Appendix A.

B. Static reduction

We define the following information structure which does not depend on the control strategy.

$$I_0^s(t) = \{x_0^s(1:t)\}, \quad (15a)$$
$$I_i^s(t) = \{x_0^s(1:t), y_i^s(1:t)\}, \quad i \in N. \quad (15b)$$

We now show that the above information structure may be viewed as the *static reduction* of the original information structure [6], [33].

Lemma 2 *For any arbitrary but fixed strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}$,*

$$I_i(t) \equiv I_i^s(t), \quad i \in N_0,$$

i.e., both sets generate the same sigma-algebra or, equivalently, they are functions of each other. Moreover, if $g \in \mathcal{G}_A$ then $I_i(t)$ and $I_i^s(t)$, $i \in N_0$, are linear functions of each other.

The proof is presented in Appendix B. In the sequel, we use Lemma 2 to replace conditioning on $I_i(t)$ by conditioning on $I_i^s(t)$ and to replace a linear function of $I_i(t)$ by a linear function of $I_i^s(t)$. As a first implication, we derive the following additional properties of the split components of the state.

Lemma 3 *For any strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}$, the split components of the state and the control action satisfy the following additional properties: for any $i \in N$,*
(P7) *For any $\tau \le t$, $\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(\tau)|I^c(t)] = 0$.*

(P8) *For any $\tau \le t$, $\mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(\tau)|I^c(t)] = 0$.*

For any matrix M of appropriate dimensions:
(P9) $\mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M x_0^s(t)] = 0$.

(P10) $\mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M x^c(t)] = 0$.

(P11) $\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M x^s(t)] = 0$.

The proof is presented in Appendix C.

C. Conditional independence and split of per-step cost

Lemma 4 *For any strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}$ and any $i, j \in N$, $i \ne j$, we have the following:*
1) $(x_i(1{:}t), u_i(1{:}t)) \perp\!\!\!\perp (x_j(1{:}t), u_j(1{:}t)) \mid I^c(t)$.
2) $x_i^s(1{:}t) \perp\!\!\!\perp x_j^s(1{:}t) \mid I_0^s(t)$.
3) $(x_i^\ell(1{:}t), u_i^\ell(1{:}t)) \perp\!\!\!\perp (x_j^\ell(1{:}t), u_j^\ell(1{:}t)) \mid I^c(t)$.

The proof is presented in Appendix D.

For ease of notation, we consider the following combinations of different components of the state:

$$z^c(t) = x^c(t) + x^s(t), \qquad z_i^\ell(t) = x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t). \quad (16)$$

Due to the conditional independence of Lemma 4, the per-step cost simplifies as follows.

Lemma 5 *The per-step cost simplifies as follows:*

$$\mathbb{E}\big[x(t)^\intercal Q x(t)\big] = \mathbb{E}\Big[z^c(t)^\intercal Q z^c(t) \\ + \sum_{i=1}^n z_i^\ell(t)^\intercal Q_{ii} z_i^\ell(t) - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^s(t) Q_{ii} x_i^s(t)\Big] \quad (17)$$

and

$$\mathbb{E}\big[u(t)^\intercal R u(t)\big] = \mathbb{E}\Big[u^c(t)^\intercal R u^c(t) + \sum_{i \in N} u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal R_{ii} u_i^\ell(t)\Big]. \quad (18)$$

The proof is presented in Appendix E.

D. Completion of squares

Lemma 6 *For random variables (x, u, w) such that w is zero-mean and independent of (x, u), and given matrices A, B, R, and S of appropriate dimensions, we have*

$$\mathbb{E}[u^\intercal R u + (Ax + Bu + w)^\intercal S(Ax + Bu + w)] \\ = \mathbb{E}[(u + Lx)^\intercal \Delta(u + Lx)] + \mathbb{E}[x^\intercal \tilde{S} x] + \mathbb{E}[w^\intercal S w],$$

where $\Delta = [R + B^\intercal SB]$, $L = \Delta^{-1} B^\intercal SA$, and $\tilde{S} = A^\intercal SA - L^\intercal \Delta L$.

Proof: Since w is zero mean and independent of (x, u):

$$\mathbb{E}[(Ax + Bu + w)^\intercal S(Ax + Bu + w)]$$
$$= \mathbb{E}[(Ax + Bu)^\intercal S(Ax + Bu) + w^\intercal Sw].$$

Now we can show

$$u^\intercal Ru + (Ax + Bu)^\intercal S(Ax + Bu) = (u + Lx)^\intercal \Delta (u + Lx) + x^\intercal \tilde{S}x$$

by expanding both sides and combining the coefficients. The proof follows by combining both the equations. ∎

Let $S^c(1{:}T)$ and $S_i^\ell(1{:}T)$ denote the solution to the following Riccati equations: Initialize $S^c(T) = Q_T$ and $S_i^\ell(T) = [Q_T]_{ii}$, $i \in N$. Then, for $t \in \{T - 1, \ldots, 1\}$, recursively define

$$S^c(t) = \mathcal{R}(S^c(t+1), A, B, Q, R), \tag{19}$$
$$S_i^\ell(t) = \mathcal{R}(S_i^\ell(t+1), A_{ii}, B_{ii}, Q_{ii}, R_{ii}), \quad i \in N. \tag{20}$$

Define the gains

$$L^c(t) = \mathcal{G}(S^c(t+1), A, B, R), \tag{21}$$
$$L_i^\ell(t) = \mathcal{G}(S_i^\ell(t+1), A_{ii}, B_{ii}, R_{ii}), \quad i \in N, \tag{22}$$

and the matrices

$$\Delta^c(t) = [R + B^\intercal S^c(t+1)B],$$
$$\Delta_i^\ell(t) = [R_{ii} + B_{ii}^\intercal S_i^\ell(t+1)B_{ii}].$$

Lemma 7 *For any strategy $g \in \mathscr{G}$, the total cost may be split as*

$$J(g) = J^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} J_i^\ell(g) + J^s, \tag{23}$$

where $J^c(g)$ is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}(u^c(t) + L^c(t)z^c(t))^\intercal \Delta^c(t)(u^c(t) + L^c(t)z^c(t))\Big],$$

and $J_i^\ell(g)$, $i \in N$, is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)z_i^\ell(t))^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)z_i^\ell(t))\Big],$$

and J^s is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[x(1)^\intercal S^c(1)x(1) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i(1)^\intercal S_i^\ell(1)x_i(1)$$
$$+ \sum_{t=1}^{T-1}\Big[w(t)^\intercal S^c(t+1)w(t) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i(t)^\intercal S_i^\ell(t+1)w_i(t)\Big]$$
$$+ \sum_{t=1}^{T-1}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\Big[(A_{i0}x_0^s(t))^\intercal S_i^\ell(t+1)(A_{i0}x_0^s(t) + 2A_{ii}x_i^s(t))\Big]$$
$$- \sum_{t=1}^{T-1}\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^s(t)Q_{ii}x_i^s(t) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^s(T)[Q_T]_{ii}x_i^s(T)\Big].$$

Proof: We start by rewriting the total cost using the result of Lemma 5. In particular, $J(g)$ can be written as

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1} z^c(t)^\intercal Q z^c(t) + u^c(t)^\intercal R u^c(t) + z^c(T)^\intercal Q_T z^c(T)\Big]$$
$$+ \mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}\sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i^\ell(t)^\intercal Q_{ii} z_i^\ell(t) + u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal R_{ii} u_i^\ell(t)$$
$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i^\ell(T)^\intercal [Q_T]_{ii} z_i^\ell(T)\Big]$$
$$- \mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^s(t)^\intercal Q_{ii} x_i^s(t) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i^s(T)^\intercal [Q_T]_{ii} x_i^s(T)\Big].$$

The dynamics of $z^c(t)$ and $z^\ell(t)$ may be written as

$$z^c(t+1) = Az^c(t) + Bu^c(t) + w(t),$$
$$z_i^\ell(t+1) = A_{ii}z_i^\ell(t) + A_{i0}x_0^s(t) + B_{ii}u_i^\ell(t) + w_i(t).$$

Note that $w(t)$ is zero mean and independent of $(z^c(t), u^c(t))$ (because both $z^c(t)$ and $u^c(t)$ depend on $w(1{:}t-1)$ which is independent of $w(t)$). Similarly, $w(t)$ is zero mean and independent of $(\text{vec}(x_0^s(t), z_i^\ell(t)), u_i^\ell(t))$. The result then follows from recursively applying Lemma 6, (P9) and (P11). ∎

Remark 1 The term J^s is control-free and depends on only the primitive random variables. Hence minimizing $J(g)$ is equivalent to minimizing $J^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} J_i^\ell(g)$.

In the next two sections, we simplify $J^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} J_i^\ell(g)$ using orthogonality properties of MMSE/ LLMS estimates and the corresponding estimation error.

IV. MAIN RESULTS FOR PROBLEM 1

A. Orthogonal Projection

As explained in Remark 1, minimizing $J(g)$ is equivalent to minimizing $J^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} J_i^\ell(g)$ defined in Lemma 7. To simplify $J^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} J_i^\ell(g)$, define

$$\hat{z}(t|c) := \mathbb{E}[z^c(t)|I^c(t)], \tag{24a}$$
$$\check{z}_i^\ell(t|i) := \mathbb{E}[z_i^\ell(t)|I_i(t)] - \mathbb{E}[z_i^\ell(t)|I_0(t)]. \tag{24b}$$

Define the "estimation errors"

$$\tilde{z}^c(t) = z^c(t) - \hat{z}(t|c), \quad \tilde{z}_i^\ell(t) = z_i^\ell(t) - \check{z}_i^\ell(t|i).$$

Lemma 8 *For any strategy $g \in \mathscr{G}$, the variables defined above satisfy the following properties:*

(C1) $\tilde{z}^c(t)$ and $\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)$ are control-free and may be written just in terms of the primitive random variables.

(C2) $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}^c(t)|I^c(t)] = 0$.

For any matrix M of appropriate dimensions:

(C3) $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}^c(t)^\intercal M \hat{z}(t|c)] = 0$.

(C4) $\mathbb{E}[u^c(t)^\intercal M \tilde{z}^c(t)] = 0$.

(C5) $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M \check{z}_i^\ell(t|i)] = 0$.

(C6) $\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M \tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)] = 0$.

The proof is presented in Appendix F.

An implication of the above is the following.

Lemma 9 *The per-step terms in $J^c(g)$ and $J_i^\ell(g)$ simplify as follows:*

$$\mathbb{E}\big[(u^c(t) + L^c(t)z^c(t))^\intercal \Delta^c(t)(u^c(t) + L^c(t)z^c(t))\big]$$
$$= \mathbb{E}\big[(u^c(t) + L^c(t)\hat{z}(t|c))^\intercal \Delta^c(t)(u^c(t) + L^c(t)\hat{z}(t|c))\big]$$
$$+ \mathbb{E}\big[\tilde{z}^c(t)^\intercal L^c(t)^\intercal \Delta^c(t)L^c(t)\tilde{z}^c(t)\big] \quad (25)$$

and

$$\mathbb{E}\big[(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)z_i^\ell(t))^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)z_i^\ell(t))\big]$$
$$= \mathbb{E}\big[(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i))^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i))\big]$$
$$+ \mathbb{E}\big[\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)^\intercal L_i^\ell(t)^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)L_i^\ell(t)\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)\big]. \quad (26)$$

Proof: Eq. (25) follows from (C2) and is equivalent to

$$\mathbb{E}[u^c(t)^\intercal \Delta^c(t)L^c(t)\tilde{z}^c(t)] = 0, \quad (27)$$
$$\mathbb{E}[\hat{z}(t|c)(t)^\intercal L^c(t)^\intercal \Delta^c(t)L^c(t)\tilde{z}^c(t)] = 0, \quad (28)$$

which is the direct result of (C3) and (C4).

Eq. (26) is equivalent to

$$\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)L_i^\ell(t)\tilde{z}^\ell(t)] = 0, \quad (29)$$
$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)^\intercal L_i^\ell(t)^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)L_i^\ell(t)\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)] = 0, \quad (30)$$

which is a direct result of (C5) and (C6). ∎
An immediate implication of Lemma 9 is the following.

Lemma 10 *For any strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}$, the cost $J^c(t)$ and $J_i^\ell(t)$ defined in Lemma 7 may be further split as*

$$J^c(g) = \hat{J}^c(g) + \tilde{J}^c, \quad J_i^\ell(g) = \breve{J}_i^\ell(g) + \tilde{J}_i^\ell,$$

where $\hat{J}^c(g)$ is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}(u^c(t) + L^c(t)\hat{z}(t|c))^\intercal \Delta^c(t)(u^c(t) + L^c(t)\hat{z}(t|c))\Big],$$

and $\tilde{J}^c$ is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}(L^c(t)\tilde{z}^c(t))^\intercal \Delta^c(t)L^c(t)\tilde{z}^c(t)\Big],$$

and $\breve{J}_i^\ell(g)$, $i \in N$, is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i))^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)(u_i^\ell(t) + L_i^\ell(t)\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i))\Big],$$

and $\tilde{J}_i^\ell$, $i \in N$, is given by

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\sum_{t=1}^{T-1}(L_i^\ell(t)\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t))^\intercal \Delta_i^\ell(t)L_i^\ell(t)\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)\Big].$$

Remark 2 Property (C1) implies that the terms $\tilde{J}^c$ and $\tilde{J}_i^\ell$ are control-free and depend only on the primitive random variables. Combined with Remark 1, this implies that minimizing $J(g)$ is equivalent to minimizing $\hat{J}^c(g) + \sum_{i\in N} \breve{J}^i(g)$.

Theorem 1 *The optimal control strategy of Problem 1 is unique and is given by*

$$u^c(t) = -L^c(t)\hat{z}(t|c) \quad (31a)$$
$$u_i^\ell(t) = -L_i^\ell(t)\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i). \quad (31b)$$

Proof: As argued in Remark 2, minimizing $J(g)$ is equivalent to minimizing $\hat{J}^c(g) + \sum_{i\in N} \breve{J}^i(g)$. By assumption, R is symmetric and positive definite and therefore so is R_{ii}. It can be shown recursively that $S^c(t)$ and $S_i^\ell(t)$ are symmetric and positive-semidefinite. Hence both $\Delta^c(t)$ and $\Delta_i^\ell(t)$ are symmetric and positive definite. Therefore

$$\hat{J}^c(g) + \sum_{i\in N} \breve{J}_i^\ell(g) \geq 0,$$

with equality if and only if the strategy g is given by (31). ∎
The optimal control strategy in Theorem 1 is described in terms of the common and local components of the control. We can write it in terms of the control actions of the agents as follows. Let

$$\hat{x}(t|c) = \mathbb{E}[x(t) \mid I^c(t)] \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{x}(t|i) = \mathbb{E}[x(t) \mid I_i(t)]$$

denote the major and i-th minor agent's MMSE estimate of the state. Eq. (16) and (24) imply the following.

Lemma 11 *The common and local information based estimates $\hat{z}(t|c)$ and $\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)$ are related to the major and minor agents' MMSE estimates as follows:*

$$\hat{z}(t|c) = \hat{x}(t|c) \quad \text{and} \quad \breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i) = \hat{x}_i(t|i) - \hat{x}_i(t|c).$$

Proof: (P8) implies that $\hat{x}(t|c) = \hat{z}(t|c)$. Moreover, since $x_i^c(t)$ is a function of $I^c(t)$ (and, therefore, a function of $I_i(t)$), we have

$$\hat{x}_i(t|i) - \hat{x}_i(t|c) = x_i^c(t) + \mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) \mid I_i(t)]$$
$$- x_i^c(t) - \mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) \mid I_0(t)]$$
$$= \breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)(t). \quad \blacksquare$$

Let $\hat{x}_i(t|c)$ and $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$ denote the i-th element of $\hat{x}(t|c)$ and $\hat{x}(t|i)$, respectively. Moreover, let $f_{i,t}$ denote the conditional density of $x_i(t)$ given $I_i(t)$. Note that $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$ is the mean of $f_{i,t}$.

For ease of exposition, we assume that the noise variables $w_i(t)$ and $v_i(t)$ admit a density, which we denote by φ_i and ν_i, respectively. Then, we have the following.

Theorem 2 *The optimal control strategy of Problem 1 is unique and is given by*

$$u_0(t) = -L_0^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c), \quad (32a)$$

and for all $i \in N$,

$$u_i(t) = -L_i^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c) - L_i^\ell(t)(\hat{x}_i(t|i) - \hat{x}_i(t|c)), \quad (32b)$$

where $L_i^c(t)$ denote the i-th row of $L^c(t)$. The major agent's MMSE estimate can be recursively updated as follows: $\hat{x}(1|c) = \text{vec}(x_1(0), 0, \ldots, 0)$ and

$$\hat{x}(t+1|c) = A\begin{bmatrix} x_0(t) \\ \hat{x}_1(t|c) \\ \vdots \\ \hat{x}_n(t|c) \end{bmatrix} + B\begin{bmatrix} u_0(t) \\ u_1^c(t|c) \\ \vdots \\ u_n^c(t|c) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} w_0(t) \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \quad (33)$$

where

$$w_0(t) = x_0(t+1) - A_{00}x_0(t) - B_{00}u_0(t).$$

Furthermore, the i-th minor agent's MMSE estimate is given by

$$\hat{x}_i(t|i) = \int x_i(t) f_{i,t}(x_{i,t}) dx_i(t) \qquad (34)$$

where the conditional density $f_{i,t}$ may be updated using the following Bayesian filter: for any $x_i(t)$,

$$f_{i,t}(x_i(t))$$
$$= \frac{\beta_i(t) \int \gamma_i(t) \gamma_0(t) f_{i,t-1}(x_i(t-1)) dx_i(t-1)}{\int \beta_i(t) \int \gamma_i(t) \gamma_0(t) f_{i,t-1}(x_i(t-1)) dx_i(t-1) dx_i(t)} \qquad (35)$$

where

$$\beta_i(t) = \nu_i(y_i(t) - C_{ii} x_i(t)),$$
$$\gamma_0(t) = \varphi_0\big(x_0(t) - A_{00} x_0(t-1) - B_{00} u_0(t-1)\big),$$
$$\gamma_i(t) = \varphi_i\big(x_i(t) - A_{ii} x_i(t-1) - A_{i0} x_0(t-1)$$
$$\qquad\qquad - B_{ii} u_i(t-1) - B_{i0} u_0(t-1)\big),$$

Proof: The structure of optimal policies follows from Lemma 11 and Theorem 1.

We establish the update of the major agent's MMSE estimate in two steps. First note that

$$\hat{x}_0(t+1|c) = \mathbb{E}[x_0(t+1)|I^c(t+1)] = x_0(t+1) \qquad (36)$$

because $x_0(t+1)$ is part of $I^c(t+1)$. This proves the zeroth component of (33). Next, for any $i \in N$,

$$\hat{x}_i(t+1|c) = \mathbb{E}[x_i(t+1)|I^c(t+1)]$$
$$\overset{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}[A_{i0} x_0(t) + B_{i0} u_0(t) + A_{ii} x_i(t) + B_{ii} u_i(t)|I^c(t+1)]$$
$$\overset{(b)}{=} A_{i0} x_0(t) + B_{i0} u_0(t) + \mathbb{E}[A_{ii} x_i(t) + B_{ii} u_i(t)|I^c(t)]$$
$$= A_{i0} x_0(t) + A_{ii} \hat{x}_i(t|c) + B_{i0} u_0(t) + B_{ii} u_i^c(t) \qquad (37)$$

where (a) is because $w_i(t)$ is zero mean and independent of $I^c(t+1)$ and (b) follows from the following:

- $x_0(t)$ and $u_0(t)$ are part of $I^c(t+1)$ so can be taken out of the expectation,
- $I^c(t+1)$ is equivalent to $(I^c(t), u_0(t), x_0(t+1))$ which, in turn, is equivalent to $(I^c(t), u_0(t), w_0(t))$. Now,

$$\mathbb{E}[A_{ii} x_i(t) + B_{ii} u_i(t)|I^c(t), u_0(t), w_0(t)]$$
$$= \mathbb{E}[A_{ii} x_i(t) + B_{ii} u_i(t)|I^c(t)]$$

because $u_0(t)$ can be removed from the conditioning since it is a function of $I^c(t)$ and $w_0(t)$ can be removed from the conditioning because it is independent of $x_i(t)$ and $u_i(t)$.

This proves the i-th component of (33).

Finally, we consider the update of the conditional density. With a slight abuse of notation, we use $\mathbb{P}(y_i(t)|x_i(t))$ to denote the conditional density of $y_i(t)$ given $x_i(t)$ and similar interpretations hold for other terms. Consider

$$f_{i,t}(x_i(t)) = \mathbb{P}(x_i(t)|I_i(t))$$
$$= \int \mathbb{P}(x_i(t), x_i(t-1)|I_i(t)) dx_i(t-1) \qquad (38)$$

Substituting $I_i(t) = (I_i(t-1), y_i(t), x_0(t), u_i(t-1), u_0(t-1))$ in (38) and using Bayes rule, we get that $f_{i,t}(x_i(t))$ is equal to

$$\frac{\int \mathbb{P}(y_i(t), x_i(t), x_0(t), u_i(t-1), u_0(t-1)|I_i(t)) dx_i(t-1)}{\iint \mathbb{P}(y_i(t), x_i(t), x_0(t), u_i(t-1), u_0(t-1) \atop |I_i(t)) dx_i(t-1) dx_i(t)} \qquad (39)$$

Now consider

$$\mathbb{P}(y_i(t), x_i(t), x_0(t), u_i(t-1), u_0(t-1)|I_i(t))$$
$$= \mathbb{P}(y_i(t)|x_i(t))$$
$$\times \mathbb{P}(x_i(t)|x_0(t-1), x_i(t-1), u_0(t-1), u_i(t-1))$$
$$\times \mathbb{P}(x_0(t)|x_0(t-1), u_0(t-1))$$
$$\times \mathbb{1}\{u_i(t-1) = g_{i,t-1}(I_i(t-1))\}$$
$$\times \mathbb{1}\{u_0(t-1) = g_{i,t-1}(I_0(t-1))\}$$
$$\times \mathbb{P}(x_i(t-1)|I_i(t-1)) \qquad (40)$$

Substitute (40) in (39); cancel the indicator terms ($\mathbb{1}\{u_i(t-1) = \cdots\}$ and $\mathbb{1}\{u_0(t-1) = \cdots\}$) from both the numerator and denominator. This gives the update equation (35). ∎

B. Implementation of the optimal control strategy

Based on Theorem 2, the optimal control strategy can be implemented as follows.

1) Computation of the gains: Before the system starts running, the agents perform the following computations:

- All agents solve the Riccati equation (19) and compute the gains $L^c(t)$ using (21). The major agent stores the row $L_0^c(t)$ while minor agent i stores the row $L_i^c(t)$. For ease of reference, we repeat the equations here:

$$S^c(t) = \mathcal{R}(S^c(t+1), A, B, Q, R),$$
$$L^c(t) = \mathcal{G}(S^c(t+1), A, B, R).$$

Note that these are global equations which depend on the dynamics and the cost of the complete system.

- Minor agent i solves the Riccati equation (20) and computes and stores the gains $L_i^\ell(t)$ using (22). For ease of reference, we repeat them here:

$$S_i^\ell(t) = \mathcal{R}(S_i^\ell(t+1), A_{ii}, B_{ii}, Q_{ii}, R_{ii}),$$
$$L_i^\ell(t) = \mathcal{G}(S_i^\ell(t+1), A_{ii}, B_{ii}, R_{ii}).$$

Note that these are local equations which depend on the local dynamics and the cost of the minor agent i.

2) Filtering and tracking of different components of the state: Once the system is running, the agents keep track of the following components of the state and their estimates:

- All agents keep track of the major agent's MMSE estimate using (33), which we repeat here: $\hat{x}(1|c) = \text{vec}(x_1(0), 0, \ldots, 0)$ and

$$\hat{x}(t+1|c) = A \begin{bmatrix} x_0(t) \\ \hat{x}_1(t|c) \\ \vdots \\ \hat{x}_n(t|c) \end{bmatrix} + B \begin{bmatrix} u_0(t) \\ u_1^c(t|c) \\ \vdots \\ u_n^c(t|c) \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} w_0(t) \\ 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

- Agent i keeps track of the density $f_{i,t}$ of $x_i(t)$ given $I_i^s(t)$ using the Bayesian filter (35) and computes the mean $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$ of this density. Note that the Bayesian filter (35) does not depend on the control strategy.

3) Implementation of the control strategies: Finally, the agents choose the control actions as follows:

- The major agent chooses $u_0(t)$ using (32a), which we repeat below:

$$u_0(t) = u_0^c(t) = -L_0^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c).$$

- The minor agent chooses $u_i(t)$ using (32b), which we repeat below:

$$\begin{aligned} u_i(t) &= u_i^c(t) + u_i^\ell(t) \\ &= -L_i^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c) - L_i^\ell(t)(\hat{x}_i(t|i) - \hat{x}_i(t|c)). \end{aligned}$$

C. The special case of state feedback

Consider the special case of the model when each minor agent observes its state perfectly. This corresponds to $C_{ii} = I$ and $v_i(t) = 0$. The information structure remains the same as before. In this case, the result of Theorem 2 simplifies as follows. The optimal control action of the major agent is

$$u_0(t) = L_0^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c), \tag{41}$$

and that of the i-th minor agent, $i \in N$, is

$$u_i(t) = L_i^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c) + L_i^\ell(t)(x_i(t) - \hat{x}_i(t|c)), \tag{42}$$

where $\hat{x}(t|c) = \mathbb{E}[x(t)|I_0(t)]$. A similar result for only one minor agent was derived in [17].

The following remarks are in order:

- The major agent observes its local state and the minor agents observer their local state and the state of the major agent. Nonetheless, the optimal control strategy involves the major agent's MMSE estimate of the global state.
- As argued before, the major agent's MMSE estimate of the state of the system evolves according to a linear filter. Therefore, the optimal control action is a linear function of the data.
- In light of the above result, we may view the optimal solution for partial output feedback as a certainty equivalence solution. In particular, the optimal strategy (32b) of the minor agent in partial output feedback is the same as the optimal strategy in state feedback where the state $x_i(t)$ is replaced by the MMSE estimate of the state.

V. Main results for Problem 2

The main idea of this section is same as that of Section IV; however instead of defining $\hat{z}(t|c)$ and $\check{z}_i^\ell(t|i)$ in terms of expectation (which can be nonlinear), we define them in terms of Hilbert space projections which are linear. We first start with an overview of basic results for Hilbert space projections.

A. Preliminaries of Hilbert space projections

Given zero mean random variables x and y defined on a common probability space we use $\mathbb{L}[x \mid y]$ to denote the LLMS (least linear mean square) estimate of x given y. A standard result in least square filtering [4, Theorem 3.2.1] is that the LLMS estimate is the projection of x on the Hilbert space Y, which is given by

$$\mathbb{L}[x \mid y] = Ky, \quad \text{where } K = \text{cov}(x,y)\,\text{var}(y)^{-1}. \tag{43}$$

When x and y are jointly Gaussian the LLMS estimate $\mathbb{L}[x \mid y]$ is equal to the MMSE estimate $\mathbb{E}[x \mid y]$ but, in general, they are different. Let Y denote the span of y. Immediate implication of (43) is that for any $z \in Y$,

$$\mathbb{E}[(x - \mathbb{L}[x \mid y])z^\mathsf{T}] = 0 \text{ and } \mathbb{E}[(x - \mathbb{L}[x \mid y])^\mathsf{T} z] = 0. \tag{44}$$

Therefore, one can think of $\mathbb{L}[x|y]$ as the projection of x into $Y = \text{span}\{y\}$. For this reason, it is convenient to write $\mathbb{L}[x|y]$ as $\mathbb{L}[x|Y]$. For any arbitrary but fixed strategy $g \in \mathscr{G}_A$ and any agent $i \in N_0$, define $H_i(t) = \text{span}\{I_i(t)\}$ and $H_i^s(t) = \text{span}\{I_i^s(t)\}$. Let $\tilde{H}_i(t)$ denote the orthogonal component of $H_i(t)$ with respect to $H_0(t)$ and $\tilde{H}_i^s(t)$ denote the orthogonal component of $H_i^s(t)$ with respect to $H_0^s(t)$. Thus,

$$H_i(t) = H_0(t) \oplus \tilde{H}_i(t) \quad \text{and} \quad H_i^s(t) = H_0^s(t) \oplus \tilde{H}_i^s(t).$$

Hence, for any random variable v,

$$\mathbb{L}[v \mid H_i(t)] = \mathbb{L}[v \mid H_0(t)] + \mathbb{L}[v \mid \tilde{H}_i(t)]. \tag{45}$$

and similar interpretations holds for projections on $H_i^s(t)$.

Now, define $W_0(t) = \text{span}\{x_0(1), w_0(1{:}t{-}1)\}$, and, for any minor agent $i \in N$, $W_i(t) = \text{span}\{x_i(1), w_i(1{:}t{-}1), v_i(1{:}t)\}$. An immediate implication of Lemma 2 is the following.

Lemma 12 *For any $g \in \mathscr{G}_A$ and $i \in N_0$, $H_i(t) = H_i^s(t)$, therefore, $\tilde{H}_i(t) = \tilde{H}_i^s(t)$. Furthermore, for all t and $i \in N$,*
  1) $H_0(t) = H_0^s(t) = W_0(t)$.
  2) $H_i(t) = H_i^s(t) \subseteq W_0(t) \oplus W_i(t)$.
  3) $\tilde{H}_i(t) = \tilde{H}_i^s(t) \subseteq W_i(t)$.

Proof: By construction, $x_0^s(t) \in W_0(t)$ and, it is easy to show that $w_0(t-1) \in H^s(t)$. Hence, $H_0^s(t) = W_0(t)$. Similarly, by construction, $y_i^s(t) \in W_0(t) \oplus W_i(t)$. Hence, $H_i^s(t) \subseteq W_0(t) \oplus W_i(t)$. Finally, consider any vector $b_i \in \tilde{H}_i^s(t)$. Then $b_i \in W_i^s(t)$ as each elements of $\tilde{H}_i^s$ is a specific linear function of $W_i(t)$ due to linear dynamics of the system. ∎

Theorem 3 *For any strategy $g \in \mathscr{G}_A$,*

$$\begin{aligned} u^c(t) &= \mathbb{E}[u_i(t) \mid I^c(t)] \in H_0^s(t), \\ u_i^\ell(t) &= u_i(t) - u^c(t) \in \tilde{H}_i^s(t). \end{aligned}$$

Proof: For any strategy $g \in \mathscr{G}_A$, $u_i(t) \in H_i(t) = H_i^s(t) = H_0^s(t) \oplus \tilde{H}_i^s(t)$. Hence there exist unique vectors $a_i(t) \in H_0^s(t)$ and $b_i(t) \in \tilde{H}_i^s(t)$, such that $u_i(t) = a_i(t) + b_i(t)$.

We have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[u_i(t) \mid I^c(t)] &\overset{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}[a_i(t) + b_i(t) \mid I^c(t)] \\ &\overset{(b)}{=} \mathbb{E}[a_i(t) \mid I^c(t)] \overset{(c)}{=} a_i(t), \end{aligned}$$

---

where (a) uses the unique orthogonal decomposition $u_i(t) = a_i(t) + b_i(t)$, (b) uses $\mathbb{E}[b_i(t) \mid I^c(t)] = 0$ from Lemma 12, Part 3, and (c) uses $\mathbb{E}[a_i(t) \mid I^c(t)] = a_i(t)$ from Lemma 12, Part 2. Hence, $u^c(t) = a_i(t) \in H_0^s(t)$. Moreover, $u_i^\ell(t) = u(t) - u^c(t) = u(t) - a_i(t) = b_i(t) \in \tilde{H}_i^s(t)$. ∎

Lemma 13 *For any $g \in \mathscr{G}_A$, we have the following:*
(S1) *For any $\tau < t$, $u^c(\tau) \in H_0(\tau) \subset H_0(t)$.*

(S2) *For any $\tau \le t$, $x^c(\tau) \in H_0(t)$.*

(S3) *For any $\tau \le t$, $x_i^\ell(\tau) \in \tilde{H}_i(t)$.*

Proof: Using (13) we have,
(S1) From the results of Theorem 3, for any $\tau < t$, $u^c(\tau) \in H_0(\tau)$ where $H_0(\tau) \subset H_0(t)$.

(S2) For any $\tau \le t$, by construction $x^c(\tau)$ is a linear function of $u^c(1{:}\tau - 1)$. Hence by (S1) $x^c(\tau) \in H_0(\tau - 1) \subset H_0(t)$.

(S3) For any $\tau \le t$, by construction $x_i^\ell(\tau)$ is a linear function of $u_i^\ell(1{:}\tau - 1)$. Hence it belongs to $\tilde{H}_i(t)$ by Theorem 3. ∎

B. Orthogonal projection

We use the same notation as in Section IV with the understanding that the terms are defined differently. We do not use any result from Section IV here, so the overlap of notation should not cause any confusion.

As explained in Remark 1, minimizing $J(g)$ is equivalent to minimizing $J^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} J_i^\ell(g)$ defined in Lemma 7. To simplify $J^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} J_i^\ell(g)$, define

$$\hat{z}(t|c) := \mathbb{L}[z^c(t)|H_0(t)], \tag{46}$$

$$\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i) := \mathbb{L}[z_i^\ell(t)|H_i(t)] - \mathbb{L}[z_i^\ell(t)|H_0(t)]. \tag{47}$$

Equation (45) and (47) imply that

$$\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i) = \mathbb{L}[z_i^\ell(t)|\tilde{H}_i(t)]. \tag{48}$$

Define the estimation errors

$$\tilde{z}^c(t) = z^c(t) - \hat{z}(t|c), \quad \tilde{z}_i^\ell(t) = z_i^\ell(t) - \breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i).$$

Lemma 14 *For any strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}_A$ the properties* (C1) *and* (C3)–(C6) *hold for $\hat{z}(t|c)$, $\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)$, $\tilde{z}^c(t)$, and $\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)$ defined above.*

The proof is presented in Appendix G. An implication of the above is the following.

Lemma 15 *For any strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}_A$, the results of Lemma 9, holds with $\hat{z}(t|c)$ and $\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)$ defined by (46) and (47).*

Proof: As mentioned in the proof of Lemma 9, (25) follows from (C3) and (C4) and is equivalent to (27) and (28).
Eq. (26) follows from (C5) and (C6) and is equivalent to (29) and (30). ∎

An immediate implication of Lemma 15 is the following.

Lemma 16 *For any strategy $g \in \mathcal{G}_A$, the results of Lemma 10 holds with $\hat{z}(t|c)$ and $\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)$ defined by (46) and (47).*

Remark 3 The terms $\tilde{J}^c$ and $\tilde{J}_i^\ell$ are control-free and depend only on the primitive random variables. Combined with Remark 1, this implies that minimizing $J(g)$ is equivalent to minimizing $\hat{J}^c(g) + \sum_{i \in N} \breve{J}^i(g)$.

C. Main results

Theorem 4 *The optimal control strategy of Problem 2 is unique and is given by*

$$u^c(t) = -L^c(t)\hat{z}(t|c) \tag{49a}$$

$$u_i^\ell(t) = -L_i^\ell(t)\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i). \tag{49b}$$

Proof: The proof relies on symmetric property and positive definiteness of both $\Delta^c(t)$ and $\Delta_i^\ell(t)$ and is same as that of Theorem 1. ∎
Now let

$$\hat{x}(t|c) = \mathbb{L}[x(t) \mid I^c(t)] \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{x}(t|i) = \mathbb{L}[x(t) \mid I_i(t)]$$

denote the major and the i-th minor agent's LLMS estimate of the state. Let $\hat{x}_i(t|c)$ and $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$ denote the i-th element of $\hat{x}(t|c)$ and $\hat{x}(t|i)$, respectively. Eq. (16), (46), and (47) imply the following.

Lemma 17 *The common and local information based estimates $\hat{z}(t|c)$ and $\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)$ are related to the major and minor agents' LLMS estimates as follows:*

$$\hat{z}(t|c) = \hat{x}(t|c) \quad \text{and} \quad \breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i) = \hat{x}_i(t|i) - \hat{x}_i(t|c).$$

Proof: First observe that (P8) implies $\hat{x}(t|c) = \hat{z}(t|c) \in H_0(t)$. Now consider that

$$\hat{x}(t|i) - \hat{x}(t|c) \overset{(a)}{=} x_i^c(t) + \mathbb{L}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) \mid H_i(t)]$$
$$- x_i^c(t) - \mathbb{L}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) \mid H_0(t)]$$
$$\overset{(b)}{=} \mathbb{L}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) \mid \tilde{H}_i(t)] + \mathbb{L}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) \mid H_0(t)]$$
$$- \mathbb{L}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) \mid H_0(t)]$$
$$= \breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i),$$

where (a) follows from (S2) and (b) uses (45). ∎

Theorem 5 *The optimal control strategy of Problem 2 is unique and is given by*

$$u_0(t) = -L_0^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c), \tag{50a}$$

and for all $i \in N$,

$$u_i(t) = -L_i^c(t)\hat{x}(t|c) - L_i^\ell(t)(\hat{x}_i(t|i) - \hat{x}_i(t|c)), \tag{50b}$$

where $L_i^c(t)$ denote the i-th row of $L^c(t)$. The major agent's LLMS estimate follow the same recursive update rule (33) *as the major agent's MMSE estimate. Furthermore, the i-th minor agent's LLMS estimate is given as follows: $\hat{x}_i(t|0) = 0$ and for $t > 1$:*

$$\hat{x}_i(t|i) = A_{ii}\hat{x}_i(t-1|i) + A_{i0}x_0(t-1)$$
$$+ B_{ii}u_i(t-1) + B_{i0}u_0(t-1) + K_i(t)\tilde{y}_i(t), \tag{51}$$

where

$$\tilde{y}_i(t) = y_i(t) - C_{ii}\big(A_{i0}x_0(t-1) + A_{ii}\hat{x}_i(t-1|i)$$
$$+ B_{i0}u_0(t-1) + B_{ii}u_i(t-1)\big)$$

and $K_i(t)$ is computed by the following standard recursive least square equations: $K_i(1) = 0$, and for $t > 1$,

$$K_i(t) = \mathcal{K}(P_i(t-1), A_{ii}, C_{ii}, \Sigma_i^w, \Sigma_i^v). \tag{52}$$

Finally in the above equation, $P_i(t) = \text{var}(x_i(t) - \hat{x}_i(t|i))$ and can be recursively updated as follows. $P_i(1) = \Sigma_i^x$, and for $t > 1$,

$$P_i(t) = \mathcal{F}(P_i(t-1), A_{ii}, C_{ii}, \Sigma_i^w, \Sigma_i^v),$$

Proof: The structure of optimal policies for the major agent follows from Lemma 17 and Theorem 4.

The update of the major agent's MMSE estimate in Theorem 2 is linear. Hence, the major agent's LLMS estimate is same as the MMSE estimate and follows the same recursive equations.

To prove the update of the i-th agent's LLMS estimate, we split the state of agent i into two components: $x_i(t) = x_i^g(t) + x_i^w(t)$, where

$$x_i^g(t+1) = A_{ii}x_i^g(t) + A_{i0}x_0(t) + B_{ii}u_i(t) + B_{i0}u_0(t),$$
$$x_i^w(t+1) = A_{ii}x_i^w(t) + w_i(t).$$

Based on this splitting of state, we split the observation of agent $i \in N$ into two components as follows: $y_i(t) = y_i^g(t) + y_i^w(t)$, where

$$y_i^g(t) = C_{ii}x_i^g(t), \quad \text{and} \quad y_i^w(t) = C_{ii}x_i^w(t) + v_i(t).$$

Observe that $x_i^w(t)$ and $y_i^w(t)$ do not depend on the control actions at agent $i \in N$. Now we have

$$\hat{x}_i(t|i) = \mathbb{L}[x_i(t)|I_i(t)] \stackrel{(a)}{=} x_i^g(t) + \mathbb{L}[x_i^w(t)|I_i(t)]$$
$$\stackrel{(b)}{=} x_i^g(t) + \mathbb{L}[x_i^w(t)|x_0^w(1:t), y_i^w(1:t)]$$
$$\stackrel{(c)}{=} x_i^g(t) + \mathbb{L}[x_i^w(t)|y_i^w(1:t)], \quad (53)$$

where (a) follows from the state split to $x_i^g(t)$ and $x_i^w(t)$, (b) follows from static reduction argument similar to the one presented in Lemma 2, and (c) follows from Assumption 1.

Let us define $\hat{x}_i^w(t|i) = \mathbb{L}[x_i^w(t)|y_i^w(1:t)]$. Observe that $\hat{x}_i^w(t|i)$ can be recursively updated using the standard LLMS updates [4] as follows

$$\hat{x}_i^w(t|i) = A_{ii}\hat{x}_i^w(t-1|i) + K_i(t)\tilde{y}_i^w(t), \quad (54)$$

where

$$\tilde{y}_i^w(t) = y_i^w(t) - C_{ii}A_{ii}\hat{x}_i^w(t-1|i)$$

and $K_i(t)$ is given by (52) where $P_i(t) = \text{var}(x_i^w(t) - \hat{x}_i^w(t|i)) = \text{var}(x_i(t) - \hat{x}_i(t|i))$, which follows from (53). Note that (53) also implies that

$$\tilde{y}_i^w(t) = y_i(t) - y_i^g(t) - C_{ii}A_{ii}\hat{x}_i^w(t-1|i)$$
$$= y_i(t) - C_{ii}(x_i^g(t) + A_{ii}\hat{x}_i^w(t-1|i))$$
$$= \tilde{y}_i(t) \quad (55)$$

where we use the dynamics of $x_i^g(t)$ and (53) to simplify the last step.

Finally, to show the recursive form of $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$, substitute (54) in (53), to get

$$\hat{x}_i(t|i) = x_i^g(t) + \hat{x}_i^w(t|i)$$
$$= A_{ii}x_i^g(t-1) + A_{i0}x_0(t-1) + B_{ii}u_i(t-1)$$
$$\quad + B_{i0}u_0(t-1) + A_{ii}\hat{x}_i^w(t-1|i) + K_i(t)\tilde{y}_i^w(t)$$
$$= A_{ii}\hat{x}_i(t-1|i) + A_{i0}x_0(t-1) + B_{ii}u_i(t-1)$$
$$\quad + B_{i0}u_0(t-1) + K_i(t)\tilde{y}_i^w(t).$$

The result then follows from substituting (55) in the above equation. ∎

Remark 4 The best linear strategies derived in Theorem 5 have a similar structure to the best linear strategies derived in [19] using spectral factorization techniques for a model with only one minor agent and stable A.

D. Implementation of the optimal control strategy

Remarkably, the implementation of the best linear control strategy is exactly same as that of the optimal strategy with one difference: the minor agents use a recursive least squares filter instead of a Bayesian filter to update the estimate $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$. The rest of the implementation is the same as described in Sec. IV-B.

VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We consider a decentralized linear quadratic system with a major agent and a collection of minor agents with a partially nested information structure and partial output feedback. The key feature of our model is that we do not assume that the noise has a Gaussian distribution. Therefore, the optimal strategy is not necessarily linear. Nonetheless, we show that the optimal strategy has an elegant structure and the following salient features:

- The common component $u^c(t)$ of the control actions is a linear function of the major agent's MMSE estimate $\hat{x}(t|c)$ of the system state. The MMSE estimate $\hat{x}(t|c)$ can be updated using a linear filter and the corresponding gains $L^c(t)$ are computed from the solution of a "global" Riccati equation.
- The local component $u_i^\ell(t)$ of the control action at minor agent i is a linear function of offset between the minor agent's MMSE estimate $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$ of the minor agent's state and the major agent's estimate $\hat{x}_i(t|c)$ of the minor agent's state. The corresponding gains $L_i^\ell(t)$ are computed from the solution of a "local" Riccati equation.
- The minor agent's MMSE estimate $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$ is, in general, a non-linear function of the data $I_i(t)$. Thus, the optimal strategy of the minor agent is a non-linear function of its data. Nonetheless, the update (35) of the conditional density does not depend on the control strategy. Thus, there is a two-way separation between estimation and control.

Interestingly, the optimal strategy is closely related to the best linear strategy. The best linear strategy has the following salient features:

- Since the major agents' MMSE estimate $\hat{x}(t|c)$ is a linear function of the data, the major agent's LLMS estimate is the same as the MMSE estimate. Therefore, the common component $u^c(t)$ of the control actions remains the same as the optimal controller.
- The minor agent's LLMS estimate $\hat{x}_i(t|i)$ is updated according to the recursive least squares filter rather than the Bayesian filter used for updating MMSE estimates.
- Therefore, the structure of the best linear controller is the same as the structure of the optimal control with the

exception that the minor agent's MMSE estimate of its local state are replaced by its LLMS estimates!

In light of the results presented in this paper, a natural question is whether these salient features are specific to the model presented in this paper or they continued to hold for more general models with delayed sharing of information and coupling between minor agents as well. We hope to be able to address these questions in the future.

APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1

We prove each property separately.

(P1) $u_0(t)$ is a function of $I_0(t)$ which, by (10), equals $I^c(t)$. Thus, $u_0^c(t) = u(t)$ and hence $u_0^\ell(t) = 0$.

(P2) This follows from (P1) and the fact that A and B matrices are block lower triangular.

(P3) This follows from the orthogonality principle of mean-squared estimation (the mean-squared estimate is orthogonal to the error).

(P4) This follows from the definition of $u_i^\ell(t)$.

(P5) This follows from (P4) and the smoothing property of conditional expectation.

(P6) By construction, $x^c(t)$ is a function of $u^c(1{:}t-1)$, which, by definition, is a function of $I^c(t)$.

APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2

For notational convenience, we use $S_A \leftsquigarrow S_B$ to denote that set S_A is a function of set S_B. Note that the relation $\leftsquigarrow$ is transitive.

We consider the cases $i = 0$ and $i \neq 0$ separately. For both cases, we will show that $I_i(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t)$ and $I_i^s(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i(t)$.

For $i = 0$, first note that (P2) implies

$$x_0(t) = x_0^c(t) + x_0^s(t). \tag{56}$$

By construction $u_0^c(t) \leftsquigarrow u_0(1{:}t-1) \subset I_0(t)$. Thus, $x_0^s(t) = x_0(t) - x_0^c(t)$, both of which are functions of $I_0(t)$. Hence, $I_0^s(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0(t)$.

We prove the reverse implication by induction. Note that $x_0(1) = x_0^s(1)$. Thus, $I_0(1) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(1)$. This forms the basis of induction. Now assume that $I_0(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$ and consider $I_0(t+1) = \{I_0(t), x_0(t+1), u_0(t)\}$. Since $u_0(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0(t)$ and, by the induction hypothesis, $I_0(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$, we have $u_0(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$. Moreover, by (56), $x^c(t) = x_0(t) - x_0^s(t)$ and, therefore, by the induction hypothesis, $x^c(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$. Since both $u_0(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$ and $x^c(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$, we have $x_0^c(t+1) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$ and hence $x_0^c(t+1) \leftsquigarrow I_0(s)$. By (56), $x_0(t+1) = x_0^c(t+1) + x_0^s(t+1)$. Hence $x_0(t+1) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t+1)$. Thus, we have shown that each components of $I_0(t+1) = \{I_0(t), x_0(t+1), u_0(t)\} \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t+1)$. Thus, by induction, $I_0(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$.

We have thus shown that $I_0^s(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0(t)$ and $I_0(t) \leftsquigarrow I_0^s(t)$. This proves that $I_0(s) \equiv I_0^s(t)$.

Now consider $i \neq 0$. By construction, $x_i^c(t) + x_i^\ell(t) \leftsquigarrow \{u_0(1{:}t-1), u_i(1{:}t-1)\} \subset I_i(t)$. Thus, $y_i^c(t) + y_i^\ell(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i(t)$ and, hence $y_i^s(t) = y_i(t) - y_i^c(t) - y_i^\ell(t)$ is a function of $I_i(t)$. We have already shown that $x_0^s(1{:}t) \leftsquigarrow x_0(1{:}t)$. Thus, $I_i^s(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i(t)$.

We prove the reverse implication by induction. Note that $y_i^c(1) = y_i^\ell(1) = 0$. Thus, $y_i(1) = y_i^s(1)$ and, as shown before $x_0(1) = x_0^s(1)$. Thus, $I_i(1) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(1)$. This forms the basis of induction. Now assume that $I_i(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t)$ and consider $I_i(t+1) = \{I_i(t), x_0(t+1), u_0(t), y_i(t+1), u_i(t)\}$. We have already shwon that $x_0(t+1)$ and $u_0(t)$ are functions of $I_0^s(t+1) \subset I_i^s(t+1)$. For $u_i(t)$, observe that $u_i(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i(t)$ and therefore, by the induction hypothesis, $u_i(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t)$. As was the case for $i = 0$, we can argue that $x_i^c(t+1) + x_i^\ell(t+1) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t)$ and therefore $y_i^c(t+1) + y_i^\ell(t+1) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t)$. Thus, from (14), $y_i(t+1) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t+1)$. Thus, by induction $I_i(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t)$.

We have thus shown that $I_i^s(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i(t)$ and $I_i(t) \leftsquigarrow I_i^s(t)$. This proves that $I_i(s) \equiv I_i^s(t)$.

Finally, if $g \in \mathscr{G}_A$, all the relationships $\leftsquigarrow$ in the above argument are linear functions. Thus, $I_i(t)$ and $I_i^s(t)$ are linear functions of each other.

APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3

We prove each property separately.

(P7) For $\tau = t$, the result is same as (P4). Now consider $\tau < t$. Recall that $I^c(t) = I_0(t)$. Thus, by Lemma 2,

$$\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)|I^c(t)] = \mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)|I_0^s(t)].$$

Now observe that,

$$I_0^s(t) = \{x_0^s(1{:}t)\} \equiv \{x_0^s(1{:}\tau), w_0(\tau{:}t-1)\}$$
$$= \{I_0^s(\tau), w_0(\tau{:}t-1)\}.$$

Thus,

$$\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(\tau)|I_0^s(t)] = \mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(\tau)|I_0^s(\tau), w_0(\tau{:}t-1)]$$
$$\overset{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(\tau)|I_0^s(\tau)] \overset{(b)}{=} \mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(\tau)|I_0(\tau)] \overset{(c)}{=} 0,$$

where (a) holds because $u_0^\ell(\tau)$ is independent of future noise $w_0(\tau{:}t-1)$, (b) uses Lemma 2, and (c) follows from (P4).

(P8) Combining (13b) and (P1), we get

$$x_i^\ell(\tau) = \sum_{\sigma=1}^{\tau-1} A_{ii}^{\sigma-1} B_{ii} u_i^\ell(\tau-\sigma).$$

Hence, the result follows from (P7).

(P9) By the smoothing property of conditional expectation, we have

$$\mathbb{E}[(x_i^\ell(t))^\intercal M x_0^s(t)] = \mathbb{E}\big[\mathbb{E}[(x_i^\ell(t))^\intercal M x_0^s(t)|I_0^s(t)]\big]$$
$$\overset{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}\big[\mathbb{E}[(x_i^\ell(t))^\intercal|I_0^s(t)] M x_0^s(t)\big]$$
$$\overset{(b)}{=} 0,$$

where (a) follows because $x_0^s(t)$ is part of $I_0^s(t)$ and (b) follows from Lemma 2 and (P8).

(P10) By the smoothing property of conditional expectation, we have

$$\mathbb{E}[(x_i^\ell(t))^\intercal M x^c(t)] = \mathbb{E}\big[\mathbb{E}[(x_i^\ell(t))^\intercal M x^c(t)|I^c(t)]\big]$$
$$\overset{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}\big[\mathbb{E}[(x_i^\ell(t))^\intercal|I^c(t)] M x^c(t)\big]$$
$$\overset{(b)}{=} 0,$$

where (a) follows because $x^c(t)$ is a function of $I^c(t)$ and (b) follows from (P8).

(P11) By the smoothing property of conditional expectation, we have

$$\mathbb{E}[(u_i^\ell(t))^\intercal M x_0^s(t)] = \mathbb{E}\big[\mathbb{E}[(u_i^\ell(t))^\intercal M x_0^s(t)|I^c(t)]\big]$$
$$\overset{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}\big[\mathbb{E}[(u_i^\ell(t))^\intercal|I^c(t)] M x_0^s(t)\big]$$
$$\overset{(b)}{=} 0,$$

where (a) follows because $x_0^s(t)$ is in $I_0^s(t)$ and therefore a function of $I^c(t)$ and (b) follows from (P4).

APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4

We prove each part separately.

1) For ease of representation, we assume that the distributions of the noise variables $w_i(t)$ and $v_i(t)$ admit a density, which we denote by φ_i and ν_i, respectively. We also assume that the joint distribution of the system variables $x(1{:}t)$, $y(1{:}t)$, $u(1{:}t)$ admits a density which we denote by f. For any strategy g and realization $x(1{:}t)$, $y(1{:}t)$, $u(1{:}t)$, define:

$$\alpha_i(t) = \mathbb{1}\{u_i(t) = g_{i,t}(I_i(t))\}, \quad i \in N_0,$$
$$\beta_i(t) = \nu_i(y_i(t) - C_{ii}x_i(t)), \quad i \in N.$$
$$\gamma_0(t) = \varphi_0\big(x_0(t) - A_{00}x_0(t-1) - B_{00}u_0(t-1)\big),$$
$$\gamma_i(t) = \varphi_i\big(x_i(t) - A_{ii}x_i(t-1) - A_{i0}x_0(t-1)$$
$$\qquad - B_{ii}u_i(t-1) - B_{i0}u_0(t-1)\big), \quad i \in N,$$

Then, by the law of total probability, we have

$$f(x(1{:}t), y(1{:}t), u(1{:}t))$$
$$= \prod_{\tau=1}^{t}\Big[\prod_{i\in N}\alpha_i(\tau)\beta_i(\tau)\gamma_i(\tau)\Big]\alpha_0(\tau)\gamma_0(\tau). \quad (57)$$

Marginalizing over $y(1{:}t)$ and observing that only $\alpha_i(\tau)$ depends on $y_i(\tau)$, we have

$$f(x(1{:}t), u(1{:}t)) =$$
$$\prod_{i\in N}\prod_{\tau=1}^{t}\gamma_i(\tau)\Big[\int \alpha_i(\tau)\beta_i(\tau)dy_i(1{:}t)\Big] \times \prod_{\tau=1}^{t}\alpha_0(\tau)\gamma_0(\tau). \quad (58)$$

Furthermore, by the law of total probability, we have

$$f(x_0(1{:}t), u_0(1{:}t)) = \prod_{\tau=1}^{t}\alpha_0(\tau)\gamma_0(\tau). \quad (59)$$

Dividing (58) by (59), we get

$$f(\{x_i(1{:}t), u_i(1{:}t)\}_{i\in N} \mid x_0(1{:}t), u_0(1{:}t))$$
$$= \prod_{i\in N}\prod_{\tau=1}^{t}\gamma_i(\tau)\Big[\int \alpha_i(\tau)\beta_i(\tau)dy_i(1{:}t)\Big]. \quad (60)$$

Marginalizing (60) over all $j \neq i$, we get

$$f(x_i(1{:}t), u_i(1{:}t) \mid x_0(1{:}t), u_0(1{:}t))$$
$$= \prod_{\tau=1}^{t}\gamma_i(\tau)\Big[\int \alpha_i(\tau)\beta_i(\tau)dy_i(1{:}t)\Big]. \quad (61)$$

The result follows from (60) and (61).

2) We prove this by induction. For $t = 1$, $x_i^s(1) = x_i(1)$ and $I_0^s(1) = \{x_0^s(1)\} = \{x_0(1)\}$. By Assumption 1, $x_i(1) \perp\!\!\!\perp x_j(1) \perp\!\!\!\perp x_0(1)$. Thus, $x_i^s(1) \perp\!\!\!\perp x_j^s(1) \mid x_0^s(1)$. This forms the basis of induction. Now assume that $x_i^s(1{:}t) \perp\!\!\!\perp x_j^s(1{:}t) \mid I_0^s(t)$. From the dynamics (13c), we have

$$x_0^s(t+1) = A_{00}x_0^s(t) + w_0(t),$$
$$x_i^s(t+1) = A_{ii}x_i^s(t) + A_{i0}x_0^s(t) + w_i(t), \quad i \in N.$$

By Assumption 1, $w_0(t) \perp\!\!\!\perp w_i(t) \perp\!\!\!\perp w_j(t)$. This, combined with the induction hypothesis implies that $x_i^s(1{:}t+1) \perp\!\!\!\perp x_j^s(1{:}t+1) \mid I_0^s(t+1)$. Hence, the result holds by induction.

3) Recall that $x_i^\ell(t) = x_i(t) - x_i^c(t) - x_i^s(t)$ and $u_i^\ell(t) = u_i(t) - u_i^c(t)$. Since $x_i^c(t)$ and $u_i^c(t)$ are functions of $I^c(t)$, the result follows from the result of the previous two parts.

APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 5

First consider (17). Since $x(t) = z^c(t) + x^\ell(t)$, we have

$$\mathbb{E}\big[x(t)^\intercal Q x(t)\big] = \mathbb{E}\Big[z^c(t)^\intercal Q z^c(t) + x^\ell(t)^\intercal Q x^\ell(t)$$
$$+ 2x^\ell(t)^\intercal Q z^c(t)\Big]. \quad (62)$$

Now from (P2) and Lemma 4 we have

$$\mathbb{E}[x^\ell(t)^\intercal Q x^\ell(t)] = \sum_{i\in N}\mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(t)^\intercal Q_{ii} x_i^\ell(t)]. \quad (63)$$

From (P10), we have

$$\mathbb{E}[x^\ell(t)^\intercal Q z^c(t)] = \mathbb{E}[x^\ell(t)^\intercal Q x^s(t)]$$
$$= \sum_{i\in N}\mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(t)^\intercal Q_{ii} x_i^s(t)], \quad (64)$$

where the last equality follows from (P2), (P9), and Lemma 4.

Substituting (63) and (64) in (62) and completing the squares, we get (17).

Now consider (18). From (P3), we get

$$\mathbb{E}\big[u(t)^\intercal R u(t)\big] = \mathbb{E}\big[u^c(t)^\intercal R u^c(t) + u^\ell(t)^\intercal R u^\ell(t)\big]. \quad (65)$$

From (P1) and Lemma 4, we get

$$\mathbb{E}[u^\ell(t)^\intercal R u^\ell(t)] = \sum_{i\in N}\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal R_{ii} u_i^\ell(t)]. \quad (66)$$

Substituting (66) in (65), we get (18).

APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 8

We prove each property separately.

(C1) For $\tilde{z}^c(t)$, observe that

$$\hat{z}(t|c) = \mathbb{E}[x^c(t)+x^s(t)|I^c(t)] = x^c(t)+\mathbb{E}[x^s(t)|I_0^s(t)].$$

where the second equality uses (P6) and Lemma 2. Thus,

$$\tilde{z}^c(t) := z^c(t) - \hat{z}(t|c) = x^s(t) - \mathbb{E}[x^s(t)|I_0^s(t)],$$

which is control-free and depends only on the primitive random variables.

For $\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)$, observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i) &= \mathbb{E}[z_i^\ell(t)|I_i(t)] - \mathbb{E}[z_i^\ell(t)|I_0(t)]\\
&= x_i^\ell(t) + \mathbb{E}[x_i^s(t)|I_i(t)]\\
&\quad - \mathbb{E}[x_i^\ell(t)|I_0(t)] - \mathbb{E}[x_i^s(t)|I_0(t)]\\
&\stackrel{(a)}{=} x_i^\ell(t) + \mathbb{E}[x_i^s(t)|I_i^s(t)] - \mathbb{E}[x_2^s(t)|I_0^s(t)],
\end{aligned}$$

where (a) uses Lemma 2 and (P8). Thus,

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t) &= z_i^\ell(t) - \breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)\\
&= x_i^s(t) - \mathbb{E}[x_i^s(t)|I_i^s(t)] + \mathbb{E}[x_i^s(t)|I_0^s(t)],
\end{aligned}$$

which is control-free and depends only on the primitive random variables.

(C2) Observe that

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}^c(t)|I^c(t)] = \mathbb{E}[z^c(t) - \hat{z}(t|c)|I^c(t)] = 0.$$

(C3) This follows immediately from the fact that error of a mean-squared estimator is orthogonal to the estimate.

(C4) Using the smoothing property we have,

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[u^c(t)M\tilde{z}^c(t)] &= \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[u^c(t)M\tilde{z}^c(t)|I^c(t)]]\\
&\stackrel{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}[u^c(t)M\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}^c(t)|I^c(t)]] \stackrel{(b)}{=} 0.
\end{aligned}$$

where (a) uses the fact that $u^c(t)$ is measurable with respect to the common information and (b) uses (C2).

(C5) For ease of notation, define

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{d}_1(t) &= \mathbb{E}[z_i^\ell(t)|I_i(t)], & \tilde{d}_1(t) &= z_i^\ell(t) - \hat{d}_1(t),\\
\hat{d}_2(t) &= \mathbb{E}[z_i^\ell(t)|I_0(t)], & \tilde{d}_2(t) &= z_i^\ell(t) - \hat{d}_2(t).
\end{aligned}$$

So, we can write

$$\begin{aligned}
z_i^\ell(t) &= \hat{d}_1(t) + \tilde{d}_1(t) = \hat{d}_2(t) + \tilde{d}_2(t),\\
\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i) &= \hat{d}_1(t) - \hat{d}_2(t),\\
\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t) &= z_i^\ell(t) - \hat{d}_1(t) + \hat{d}_2(t) = \tilde{d}_1(t) + \hat{d}_2(t).
\end{aligned}$$

From the orthogonality principle, $\tilde{d}_1(t) \perp \hat{d}_1(t)$ and $\tilde{d}_2(t) \perp \hat{d}_2(t)$. Since $I_0(t)$ is a subset of $I_i(t)$, $\tilde{d}_1(t) \perp \hat{d}_2(t)$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[(\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t))^\intercal \breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)] &= \mathbb{E}[(\tilde{d}_1(t)+\hat{d}_2(t))^\intercal(\hat{d}_1(t)-\hat{d}_2(t))]\\
&= \mathbb{E}[\hat{d}_2(t)^\intercal(\hat{d}_1(t)-\hat{d}_2(t))]\\
&= \mathbb{E}[\hat{d}_2(t)^\intercal(\tilde{d}_2(t)-\tilde{d}_1(t))]\\
&= 0. \tag{67}
\end{aligned}$$

(C6) Recall the definitions of $\hat{d}_1(t)$ and $\hat{d}_2(t)$ from the proof of (C5). Since $\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t) = \tilde{d}_1(t) + \hat{d}_2(t)$, we have

$$\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)] = \mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\tilde{d}_1(t)]+\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\hat{d}_2(t)].$$

Now, we show that both terms are zero. Consider

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\tilde{d}_1(t)] &= \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\tilde{d}_1(t) \mid I_i(t)]]\\
&\stackrel{(a)}{=} \mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\mathbb{E}[\tilde{d}_1(t) \mid I_i(t)]]\\
&\stackrel{(b)}{=} 0,
\end{aligned}$$

where (a) follows because $u_i^\ell(t)$ is a function of $I_i(t)$ and (b) follows from the definition of $\tilde{d}_1(t)$. Now consider

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\hat{d}_2(t)] &= \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\hat{d}_2(t) \mid I_0(t)]]\\
&\stackrel{(c)}{=} \mathbb{E}[\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal \mid I_0(t)]M\hat{d}_2(t)]\\
&\stackrel{(d)}{=} 0,
\end{aligned}$$

where (c) follows from the definition of $\hat{d}_2(t)$ and (d) follows from (P4).

APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 14

We prove each property separately.

(C1) For $\tilde{z}^c(t)$, observe that

$$\hat{z}(t|c) = \mathbb{L}[x^c(t)+x^s(t)|H_0(t)] = x^c(t)+\mathbb{L}[x^s(t)|H_0^s(t)].$$

where the second equality uses (S2) and Remark 12. Thus,

$$\tilde{z}^c(t) := z^c(t) - \hat{z}(t|c) = x^s(t) - \mathbb{L}[x^s(t)|H_0^s(t)],$$

which is control-free and depends only on the primitive random variables.

For $\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)$, observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{z}_i^\ell &= z_i^\ell(t) - \mathbb{L}[z_i^\ell(t)|\tilde{H}_i(t)]\\
&= x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t) - \mathbb{L}[x_i^\ell(t) + x_i^s(t)|\tilde{H}_i(t)]\\
&\stackrel{(a)}{=} x_i^s(t) - \mathbb{L}[x_i^s(t)|\tilde{H}_i(t)]\\
&\stackrel{(b)}{=} x_i^s(t) - \mathbb{L}[x_i^s(t)|\tilde{H}_i^s(t)],
\end{aligned}$$

where (a) uses (S3) and (b) uses Remark 12. Thus, $\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)$ is control-free and depends only on the primitive random variables.

(C3) By definition, $M\hat{z}(t|c)$ is a linear function of $I^c(t)$. Hence, $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}^c(t)^\intercal M\hat{z}(t|c)] = 0$ by (44).

(C4) $M^\intercal u^c(t)$ is a linear function of $u^c(t)$ and hence by (S1) belongs to $H_0(t)$. Hence, $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}^c(t)^\intercal M^\intercal u^c(t)] = 0$ by (44). Therefore $\mathbb{E}[u^c(t)^\intercal M\tilde{z}^c(t)] = 0$.

(C5) Again by definition, $M\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)$ is a linear function of $\tilde{I}_i(t)$. Hence, $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\breve{z}_i^\ell(t|i)] = 0$ by (44).

(C6) $M^\intercal u_i^\ell(t)$ is a linear function of $u_i^\ell(t)$ which belongs to $\tilde{H}_i(t)$ by Theorem 3, and hence is a linear function of $\tilde{I}_i(t)$. Therefore $\mathbb{E}[\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M^\intercal u_i^\ell(t)] = 0$ by (44) which results in $\mathbb{E}[u_i^\ell(t)^\intercal M\tilde{z}_i^\ell(t)] = 0$.

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Mohammad Afshari (S'12) received the B.S. and the M.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering from the Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran, in 2010 and 2012, respectively. He is currently working towards the Ph.D. degree in Electrical and Computer Engineering at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. His current area of research is decentralized stochastic control, team theory, and reinforcement learning.

Mr. Afshari is member of the McGill Center of Intelligent Machines (CIM) and member of the Research Group in Decision Analysis (GERAD).

Aditya Mahajan (S'06-M'09-SM'14) received B.Tech degree from the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur, India, in 2003, and M.S. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA, in 2006 and 2008. From 2008 to 2010, he was a Postdoctoral Researcher at Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA. He has been with the department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, McGill University, Montreal, Canada, since 2010 where he is currently Associate Professor. He currently serves as Associate Editor of Springer Mathematics of Control, Signal, and Systems. He was an Associate Editor of the IEEE Control Systems Society Conference Editorial Board from 2014 to 2017. He is the recipient of the 2015 George Axelby Outstanding Paper Award, 2014 CDC Best Student Paper Award (as supervisor), and the 2016 NecSys Best Student Paper Award (as supervisor). His principal research interests include decentralized stochastic control, team theory, multi-armed bandits, real-time communication, information theory, and reinforcement learning.