

Distortion-transmission trade-off in real-time transmission of Markov sources


Jhelum Chakravorty and Aditya Mahajan

McGill University


IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)

28 April, 2015

The system model




The system model



$$X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t$$

The system model


$$Y_t = \begin{cases} X_t, & \text{if } U_t = 1 \\ \varepsilon, & \text{if } U_t = 0 \end{cases}$$



$$X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t$$


$$U_t = f_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

The system model



The system model

$$Y_t = \begin{cases} X_t, & \text{if } U_t = 1 \\ \varepsilon, & \text{if } U_t = 0 \end{cases}$$



$$X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t$$

$$U_t = f_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$


$$\hat{X}_t = g_t(Y_{1:t})$$

Communication Strategies

- ▶ Transmission strategy $f = \{f_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$.
- ▶ Estimation strategy $g = \{g_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$.

The system model

$$Y_t = \begin{cases} X_t, & \text{if } U_t = 1 \\ \varepsilon, & \text{if } U_t = 0 \end{cases}$$



$$X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t$$

$$U_t = f_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$


$$\hat{X}_t = g_t(Y_{1:t})$$

1. Discounted setup, $\beta \in (0, 1)$

$$D_\beta(f, g) = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t d(X_t - \hat{X}_t) \right]; \quad N_\beta(f, g) = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U_t \right]$$

The system model

$$Y_t = \begin{cases} X_t, & \text{if } U_t = 1 \\ \varepsilon, & \text{if } U_t = 0 \end{cases}$$



$$X_{t+1} = X_t + W_t$$

$$U_t = f_t(X_{1:t}, U_{1:t-1})$$

$$\hat{X}_t = g_t(Y_{1:t})$$

1. Discounted setup, $\beta \in (0, 1)$

$$D_\beta(f, g) = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t d(X_t - \hat{X}_t) \right]; \quad N_\beta(f, g) = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U_t \right]$$

2. Average cost setup, $\beta = 1$

$$D_1(f, g) = \limsup_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} d(X_t - \hat{X}_t) \right]; \quad N_1(f, g) = \limsup_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} U_t \right]$$

Optimization problems

Costly communication

$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$

Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$


Optimization problems

Costly communication

$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$

Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$




Optimization problems

Costly communication

$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$

Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$



C_{β}^* is cts, inc, and concave


Optimization problems

Costly communication


$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$

Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$



C_{β}^* is cts, inc, and concave




Optimization problems

Costly communication


$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$

Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$



C_{β}^* is cts, inc, and concave



D_{β}^* is cts, dec, and convex


Optimization problems

Costly communication

$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f,g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$


Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f,g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$



C_{β}^* is cts, inc, and concave

Distortion-transmission trade-off



D_{β}^* is cts, dec, and convex


Optimization problems

Costly communication

$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f,g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$

Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f,g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$



Distortion-transmission trade-off



C_{β}^* is a

We provide explicit computable expressions for both curves

ex

Comparison to Information Theory

- ▶ Costly communication is analogous to communication under power constraint.
- ▶ Distortion-transmission is analogous to distortion-rate trade-off.

Comparison to Information Theory

- ▶ Costly communication is analogous to communication under power constraint.
- ▶ Distortion-transmission is analogous to distortion-rate trade-off.
- ▶ The source reconstruction must be done in **real-time** (or with zero delay).

Comparison to Information Theory

- ▶ **Costly communication** is analogous to **communication under power constraint**.
- ▶ **Distortion-transmission** is analogous to **distortion-rate** trade-off.
- ▶ The source reconstruction must be done in **real-time** (or with zero delay).

Comparison to real-time communication

- ▶ Special case of the real-time communication model
[Witsenhausen 1979, Walrand-Varaiya 1983, Teneketzis 2006, Teneketzis-Mahajan 2009 . . .].
- ▶ Existing results in the literature establish **structure** of optimal coding strategies and a **dynamic program** to identify optimal strategies.
- ▶ The resultant dynamic programs correspond to decentralized control problem and are hard to solve.

Comparison to Information Theory

- ▶ **Costly communication** is analogous to **communication under power constraint**.
- ▶ **Distortion-transmission** is analogous to **distortion-rate** trade-off.
- ▶ The source reconstruction must be done in **real-time** (or with zero delay).

Comparison to real-time communication

- ▶ Special case of the real-time communication model
[Witsenhausen 1979, Walrand-Varaiya 1983, Teneketzis 2006, Teneketzis-Mahajan 2009 . . .].
- ▶ Existing results in the literature establish **structure** of optimal coding strategies and a **dynamic program** to identify optimal strategies.
- ▶ The resultant dynamic programs correspond to decentralized control problem and are hard to solve.

Our approach

- ▶ Previous results have established the structure of optimal strategies.
- ▶ Exploit the structural results to explicitly identify optimal strategies.

Modeling assumptions

Markov chain setup

State spaces $X_t, W_t \in \mathbb{Z}$

Guass-Markov setup

$X_t, W_t \in \mathbb{R}$

Modeling assumptions

Markov chain setup

State spaces $X_t, W_t \in \mathbb{Z}$

Noise distribution Unimodal and symmetric


$$p_e = p_{-e} \geq p_{e+1}$$

Gauss-Markov setup

$X_t, W_t \in \mathbb{R}$

Zero-mean Gaussian

$$\varphi_\sigma(\cdot)$$



Modeling assumptions

Markov chain setup

State spaces $X_t, W_t \in \mathbb{Z}$

Noise distribution Unimodal and symmetric
 $p_e = p_{-e} \geq p_{e+1}$



Distortion Even and increasing
 $d(e) = d(-e) \geq d(e+1)$

Gauss-Markov setup

$X_t, W_t \in \mathbb{R}$

Zero-mean Gaussian
 $\varphi_\sigma(\cdot)$

Mean-squared
 $d(e) = |e|^2$




Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies

Step 2 Performance of arbitrary
threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$

Step 3 Values of λ for which
 $f^{(k)}$ is optimal

Step 4 Distortion-transmission
trade-off

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of
strategies (f, g)

Step 3 Values of λ for which
 $f^{(k)}$ is optimal

Step 2 Performance of arbitrary
threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$

Step 4 Distortion-transmission
trade-off

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies



Search space of strategies (f, g)


Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal

Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of strategies (f, g)

Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$




Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of strategies (f, g)


Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$




Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off



Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of strategies (f, g)


Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$



Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off



Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies

Model the communication system as decentralized stochastic control

- ▶ Two decision makers: transmitter and receiver. Non-nested information.

- ▶ **Common-information approach** [Nayyar–Mahajan–Teneketzis 2013]

Equivalent centralized problem from the point of view of a coordinator.

Choose code functions at each step (rather than actions).

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies

Model the communication system as decentralized stochastic control

- ▶ Two decision makers: transmitter and receiver. Non-nested information.

- ▶ **Common-information approach** [Nayyar–Mahajan–Teneketzis 2013]

Equivalent centralized problem from the point of view of a coordinator.

Choose code functions at each step (rather than actions).

Previous results

- ▶ **Gauss-Markov setup** [Lipsa–Martins 2009 and 2011, Molin–Hirche 2009]

- ▶ **Markov-chain setup** [Nayyar–Başar–Teneketzis–Veeravalli 2013]

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies

Model the communication system as decentralized stochastic control

- ▶ Two decision makers: transmitter and receiver. Non-nested information.
- ▶ **Common-information approach** [Nayyar-Mahajan-Teneketzis 2013]
Equivalent centralized problem from the point of view of a coordinator.
Choose code functions at each step (rather than actions).

Previous results

- ▶ **Gauss-Markov setup** [Lipsa-Martins 2009 and 2011, Molin-Hirche 2009]
- ▶ **Markov-chain setup** [Nayyar-Başar-Teneketzis-Veeravalli 2013]

Proof idea: Majorization-based partial order on belief states.

Prove that $\pi \succeq_m \varphi \implies V(\pi) \geq V(\varphi)$.

Step 1 Structure of optimal estimator (Nayyar et al, 2013)

Transmitted Process Let Z_t denote the most recently transmitted value of the Markov source.

$$Z_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t = \begin{cases} X_t & \text{if } U_t = 1; \\ Z_{t-1} & \text{if } U_t = 0. \end{cases}$$

The estimator can keep track of Z_t as follows:

$$Z_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t = \begin{cases} Y_t & \text{if } Y_t \neq \varepsilon; \\ Z_{t-1} & \text{if } Y_t = \varepsilon. \end{cases}$$

Step 1 Structure of optimal estimator (Nayyar et al, 2013)

Transmitted Process Let Z_t denote the most recently transmitted value of the Markov source.

$$Z_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t = \begin{cases} X_t & \text{if } U_t = 1; \\ Z_{t-1} & \text{if } U_t = 0. \end{cases}$$

The estimator can keep track of Z_t as follows:

$$Z_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad Z_t = \begin{cases} Y_t & \text{if } Y_t \neq \varepsilon; \\ Z_{t-1} & \text{if } Y_t = \varepsilon. \end{cases}$$

Theorem 1 The process $\{Z_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is a sufficient statistic at the estimator and an optimal estimation strategy is given by

$$\hat{X}_t = \mathbf{g}_t^*(Z_t) = Z_t \quad (*)$$

Remark ▶ The optimal estimation strategy is **time-homogeneous** and can be specified in closed form.

Step 1 Structure of optimal transmitter (Nayyar et al)

Error process Let $E_t = X_t - Z_{t-1}$ denote the error process. $\{E_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is a controlled Markov process where

$$E_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}(E_{t+1} = n \mid E_t = e, U_t = u) = \begin{cases} p_{|e-n|}, & \text{if } u = 0; \\ p_n, & \text{if } u = 1. \end{cases}$$

Step 1 Structure of optimal transmitter (Nayyar et al)

Error process Let $E_t = X_t - Z_{t-1}$ denote the error process. $\{E_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is a controlled Markov process where

$$E_0 = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbb{P}(E_{t+1} = n \mid E_t = e, U_t = u) = \begin{cases} p_{|e-n|}, & \text{if } u = 0; \\ p_n, & \text{if } u = 1. \end{cases}$$

Theorem 2 When the estimation strategy is of the form $(*)$, then $\{E_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ is a sufficient statistic at the transmitter.

Furthermore, an optimal transmission strategy is characterized by a time-varying threshold $\{k_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, i.e.,

$$U_t = f_t(E_t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |E_t| \geq k_t; \\ 0 & \text{if } |E_t| < k_t. \end{cases}$$

Step 1 Main idea

Restrict attention to **time-homogeneous** estimation strategies of the form

$$\hat{X}_t = g_t^*(Z_t) = Z_t.$$

Consider the problem of finding the **best-response** transmission strategy.

Under appropriate technical conditions, the best-response strategy is **time-homogeneous**.

Step 1 Main idea

Restrict attention to **time-homogeneous** estimation strategies of the form


$$\hat{X}_t = g_t^*(Z_t) = Z_t.$$

Consider the problem of finding the **best-response** transmission strategy.

Under appropriate technical conditions, the best-response strategy is **time-homogeneous**.


Find the best **threshold-based** strategy within the class $\mathcal{F} = \{f^{(k)} : k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}\}$ where

$$f^{(k)}(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| \geq k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$




Search space of
strategies (f, g)

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of strategies (f, g)


Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$



Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal




Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off



Step 2 Performance of threshold strategies

Consider a **threshold-based** strategy


$$f^{(k)}(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| \geq k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



Step 2 Performance of threshold strategies

Consider a **threshold-based** strategy

$$f^{(k)}(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| \geq k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$




Let $\tau^{(k)}$ denote the **stopping time** of first transmission (starting at $E_0 = 0$).



Step 2 Performance of threshold strategies

Consider a **threshold-based** strategy

$$f^{(k)}(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| \geq k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



Let $\tau^{(k)}$ denote the **stopping time** of first transmission (starting at $E_0 = 0$).




Define ▶ $L_\beta^{(k)} = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\tau^{(k)}-1} \beta^t d(E_t) \mid E_0 = 0 \right].$

▶ $M_\beta^{(k)} = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\tau^{(k)}-1} \beta^t \mid E_0 = 0 \right].$

Step 2 Performance of threshold strategies

Consider a **threshold-based** strategy

$$f^{(k)}(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| \geq k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



Let $\tau^{(k)}$ denote the **stopping time** of first transmission (starting at $E_0 = 0$).



Define $\blacktriangleright L_\beta^{(k)} = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\tau^{(k)}-1} \beta^t d(E_t) \mid E_0 = 0 \right]$.


$\blacktriangleright M_\beta^{(k)} = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\tau^{(k)}-1} \beta^t \mid E_0 = 0 \right]$.

Proposition $\{E_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ is a **regenerative process** and by renewal theory, we have that

$$D_\beta^{(k)} := D_\beta(f^{(k)}, g^*) = \frac{L_\beta^{(k)}}{M_\beta^{(k)}} \quad \text{and} \quad N_\beta^{(k)} := N_\beta(f^{(k)}, g^*) = \frac{1}{M_\beta^{(k)}} - (1 - \beta).$$

Step 2 Computing $D_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $N_{\beta}^{(k)}$

- Notation**
- ▶ $\mathcal{S}^{(k)} = \{-(k-1), \dots, k-1\}$.
 - ▶ $[P^{(k)}]_{ij} = p_{|i-j|}$, for $i, j \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.
 - ▶ $[d^{(k)}]_i = d(i)$, for $i \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.
 - ▶ $[1^{(k)}]_i = 1$, for $i \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.




Step 2 Computing $D_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $N_{\beta}^{(k)}$

- Notation**
- ▶ $\mathcal{S}^{(k)} = \{-(k-1), \dots, k-1\}$.
 - ▶ $[P^{(k)}]_{ij} = p_{|i-j|}$, for $i, j \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.
 - ▶ $[d^{(k)}]_i = d(i)$, for $i \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.
 - ▶ $[1^{(k)}]_i = 1$, for $i \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.



- Proposition**
- ▶ $L_{\beta}^{(k)} = [I - \beta P^{(k)}]^{-1} d^{(k)}|_0$.
 - ▶ $M_{\beta}^{(k)} = [I - \beta P^{(k)}]^{-1} 1^{(k)}|_0$.




Step 2 Computing $D_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $N_{\beta}^{(k)}$

- Notation**
- ▶ $\mathcal{S}^{(k)} = \{-(k-1), \dots, k-1\}$.
 - ▶ $[P^{(k)}]_{ij} = p_{|i-j|}$, for $i, j \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.
 - ▶ $[d^{(k)}]_i = d(i)$, for $i \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.
 - ▶ $[1^{(k)}]_i = 1$, for $i \in \mathcal{S}^{(k)}$.




- Proposition**
- ▶ $L_{\beta}^{(k)} = [I - \beta P^{(k)}]^{-1} d^{(k)}]_0$.
 - ▶ $M_{\beta}^{(k)} = [I - \beta P^{(k)}]^{-1} 1^{(k)}]_0$.



$D_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $N_{\beta}^{(k)}$ can be computed using these expressions.

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of strategies (f, g)


Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$



Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off



Step 3 Properties of optimal thresholds

Monotonicity

$$L_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > L_{\beta}^{(k)} \quad \text{and} \quad M_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > M_{\beta}^{(k)}$$

Depends on
unimodularity of noise

Step 3 Properties of optimal thresholds

Monotonicity

$$L_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > L_{\beta}^{(k)} \quad \text{and} \quad M_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > M_{\beta}^{(k)}$$

Implication:

$$D_{\beta}^{(k+1)} \geq D_{\beta}^{(k)} \quad \text{and} \quad N_{\beta}^{(k+1)} < N_{\beta}^{(k)}$$

Use DP and
monotonicity of
Bellman operator

Step 3 Properties of optimal thresholds

Monotonicity $L_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > L_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $M_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > M_{\beta}^{(k)}$

Implication:

$D_{\beta}^{(k+1)} \geq D_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $N_{\beta}^{(k+1)} < N_{\beta}^{(k)}$

Submodularity $C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda) := D_{\beta}^{(k)} + \lambda N_{\beta}^{(k)}$ is **submodular** in (k, λ) .

Step 3 Properties of optimal thresholds

Monotonicity $L_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > L_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $M_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > M_{\beta}^{(k)}$

Implication:

$$D_{\beta}^{(k+1)} \geq D_{\beta}^{(k)} \quad \text{and} \quad N_{\beta}^{(k+1)} < N_{\beta}^{(k)}$$

Submodularity $C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda) := D_{\beta}^{(k)} + \lambda N_{\beta}^{(k)}$ is **submodular** in (k, λ) .

Proof: $C_{\beta}^{(k+1)}(\lambda) - C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda) = D_{\beta}^{(k+1)}(\lambda) - D_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda) - \lambda \underbrace{(N_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda) - N_{\beta}^{(k+1)}(\lambda))}_{\geq 0}$.

Step 3 Properties of optimal thresholds


Monotonicity $L_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > L_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $M_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > M_{\beta}^{(k)}$

Implication:

$D_{\beta}^{(k+1)} \geq D_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $N_{\beta}^{(k+1)} < N_{\beta}^{(k)}$

Submodularity $C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda) := D_{\beta}^{(k)} + \lambda N_{\beta}^{(k)}$ is **submodular** in (k, λ) .

Proposition $k_{\beta}^*(\lambda) := \arg \min_{k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}} C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda)$ is increasing in λ .



Step 3 Properties of optimal thresholds

Monotonicity $L_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > L_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $M_{\beta}^{(k+1)} > M_{\beta}^{(k)}$


Implication:

$D_{\beta}^{(k+1)} \geq D_{\beta}^{(k)}$ and $N_{\beta}^{(k+1)} < N_{\beta}^{(k)}$


Submodularity $C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda) := D_{\beta}^{(k)} + \lambda N_{\beta}^{(k)}$ is **submodular** in (k, λ) .

Proposition $k_{\beta}^*(\lambda) := \arg \min_{k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}} C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda)$ is increasing in λ .

Define $\Lambda_{\beta}^{(k)} := \{\lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} : k_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = k\} = [\lambda_{\beta}^{(k-1)}, \lambda_{\beta}^{(k)}]$.




Step 3 Optimal costly communication




$$C_\beta^{(k)}(\lambda_\beta^{(k)}) = C_\beta^{(k+1)}(\lambda_\beta^{(k)})$$

Step 3 Optimal costly communication



$$C_\beta^{(k)}(\lambda_\beta^{(k)}) = C_\beta^{(k+1)}(\lambda_\beta^{(k)})$$


Step 3 Optimal costly communication




$$C_{\beta}^{(k)}(\lambda_{\beta}^{(k)}) = C_{\beta}^{(k+1)}(\lambda_{\beta}^{(k)})$$

$$\lambda_{\beta}^{(k)} = \frac{D_{\beta}^{(k+1)} - D_{\beta}^{(k)}}{N_{\beta}^{(k)} - N_{\beta}^{(k+1)}}$$


Step 3 Optimal costly communication



Step 3 Optimal costly communication




Step 3 Optimal costly communication



Theorem ▶ For all $\lambda \in (\lambda_{\beta}^{(k)}, \lambda_{\beta}^{(k+1)}]$ the threshold strategy $f^{(k+1)}$ is optimal.

▶ $C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = \min_{k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}} C_{\beta}^{(k)}$ is piecewise linear, continuous, concave, and increasing function of λ .

Step 3 Optimal costly communication




$$(\lambda_{\beta}^{(k)}, D_{\beta}^{(k)} + \lambda_{\beta}^{(k)} N_{\beta}^{(k)})$$

Theorem ▶ For all $\lambda \in (\lambda_{\beta}^{(k)}, \lambda_{\beta}^{(k+1)})$ the threshold strategy $f^{(k+1)}$ is optimal.


▶ $C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = \min_{k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}} C_{\beta}^{(k)}$ is piecewise linear, continuous, concave, and increasing function of λ .

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of strategies (f, g)


Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$



Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Sufficient conditions for constrained optimality

A strategy (f°, g°) is optimal for the constrained communication problem if

(C1) $N_\beta(f^\circ, g^\circ) = \alpha$

(C2) There exists $\lambda^\circ \geq 0$ such that (f°, g°) is optimal for $C_\beta(f, g; \lambda^\circ)$.


Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Sufficient conditions for constrained optimality

A strategy (f°, g°) is optimal for the constrained communication problem if

$$(C1) \quad N_\beta(f^\circ, g^\circ) = \alpha$$

(C2) There exists $\lambda^\circ \geq 0$ such that (f°, g°) is optimal for $C_\beta(f, g; \lambda^\circ)$.




Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Sufficient conditions for constrained optimality

A strategy (f°, g°) is optimal for the constrained communication problem if

$$(C1) \quad N_\beta(f^\circ, g^\circ) = \alpha$$

(C2) There exists $\lambda^\circ \geq 0$ such that (f°, g°) is optimal for $C_\beta(f, g; \lambda^\circ)$.



Let k_β^* be such that
 $N_\beta^{(k_\beta^*)} > \alpha > N_\beta^{(k_\beta^*+1)}$


Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Sufficient conditions for constrained optimality

A strategy (f°, g°) is optimal for the constrained communication problem if

$$(C1) \quad N_\beta(f^\circ, g^\circ) = \alpha$$

(C2) There exists $\lambda^\circ \geq 0$ such that (f°, g°) is optimal for $C_\beta(f, g; \lambda^\circ)$.



Let k_β^* be such that
 $N_\beta^{(k_\beta^*)} > \alpha > N_\beta^{(k_\beta^*+1)}$


Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Sufficient conditions for constrained optimality

A strategy (f°, g°) is optimal for the constrained communication problem if

$$(C1) \quad N_\beta(f^\circ, g^\circ) = \alpha$$

(C2) There exists $\lambda^\circ \geq 0$ such that (f°, g°) is optimal for $C_\beta(f, g; \lambda^\circ)$.



Let k_β^* be such that
 $N_\beta^{(k_\beta^*)} > \alpha > N_\beta^{(k_\beta^*+1)}$


Bernoulli randomized strategy $(\theta^*, f^{(k)}, f^{(k+1)})$ is optimal where

$$\theta^* N_\beta^{(k)} + (1 - \theta^*) N_\beta^{(k+1)} = \alpha$$

Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Sufficient conditions for constrained optimality

A strategy (f°, g°) is optimal for the constrained communication problem if




Bernoulli randomized strategy $(\theta^*, f^{(k)}, f^{(k+1)})$ is **optimal** where

$$\theta^* N_\beta^{(k)} + (1 - \theta^*) N_\beta^{(k+1)} = \alpha$$

Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off

Sufficient conditions for constrained optimality

A strategy (f°, g°) is optimal for the constrained communication problem if



Bernoulli randomized strategy $(\theta^*, f^{(k)}, f^{(k+1)})$ is optimal where

$$\theta^* N_\beta^{(k)} + (1 - \theta^*) N_\beta^{(k+1)} = \alpha$$

Step 4 Features of optimal strategy

Optimal strategy

$$f^*(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| > k_\beta^* \\ 1 & \text{w.p. } \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{w.p. } 1 - \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{if } |e| < k_\beta^* \end{cases}$$

Step 4 Features of optimal strategy

Optimal strategy

$$f^*(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| > k_\beta^* \\ 1 & \text{w.p. } \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{w.p. } 1 - \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{if } |e| < k_\beta^* \end{cases}$$

Randomized action
at a single state

Step 4 Features of optimal strategy

Optimal strategy

$$f^*(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| > k_\beta^* \\ 1 & \text{w.p. } \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{w.p. } 1 - \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{if } |e| < k_\beta^* \end{cases}$$

Randomized action
at a single state

Deterministic implementation

Time-sharing strategies

- ▶ Assume $\theta^* = a/(a + b)$.
- ▶ Choose strategy $f^{(k^*)}$ for a visits to state zero and strategy $f^{(k^*+1)}$ for b visits to state zero and so on.

Step 4 Features of optimal strategy

Optimal strategy

$$f^*(e) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } |e| > k_\beta^* \\ 1 & \text{w.p. } \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{w.p. } 1 - \theta^* \text{ if } |e| = k_\beta^* \\ 0 & \text{if } |e| < k_\beta^* \end{cases}$$

Randomized action
at a single state

Deterministic implementation


Time-sharing strategies

- ▶ Assume $\theta^* = a/(a + b)$.
- ▶ Choose strategy $f^{(k^*)}$ for a visits to state zero and strategy $f^{(k^*+1)}$ for b visits to state zero and so on.

Steering strategies:


- ▶ Let α_t^i denote the number of times action i is chosen in the past.
- ▶ At states $\{-k^*, k^*\}$ choose an action that **steers** the empirical frequency closer to the desired randomization probability.

An example: Symmetric birth-death Markov Chain



$$P_{ij} = \begin{cases} p, & \text{if } |i-j| = 1; \\ 1-2p, & \text{if } i=j; \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad \text{where } p \in (0, \frac{1}{2}), \quad d(e) = |e|$$

An example: Symmetric birth-death Markov Chain




Discounted cost Let $K_\beta = -2 - (1 - \beta)/\beta p$ and $m_\beta = \cosh^{-1}(-K_\beta/2)$.

$$D_\beta^{(k)} = \frac{\sinh(km_\beta) - k \sinh(m_\beta)}{2 \sinh^2(km_\beta/2) \sinh(m_\beta)}$$

$$N_\beta^{(k)} = \frac{2\beta p \sinh^2(m_\beta/2) \cosh(km_\beta)}{\sinh^2(km_\beta/2)} - (1 - \beta)$$

Average cost $D_1^{(k)} = \frac{k^2 - 1}{3k}$ and $N_1^{(k)} = \frac{2p}{k^2}$

An example: Symmetric birth-death Markov Chain



Discounted cost Let $K_\beta = -2 - (1 - \beta)/\beta p$ and $m_\beta = \cosh^{-1}(-K_\beta/2)$.

$$D_\beta^{(k)} = \frac{\sinh(km_\beta) - k \sinh(m_\beta)}{2 \sinh^2(km_\beta/2) \sinh(m_\beta)}$$


$$N_\beta^{(k)} = \frac{2\beta p \sinh^2(m_\beta/2) \cosh(km_\beta)}{\sinh^2(km_\beta/2)} - (1 - \beta)$$

$\lambda_\beta^{(k)}$ can be computed in terms of $D_\beta^{(k)}$ and $N_\beta^{(k)}$.


Average cost $D_1^{(k)} = \frac{k^2 - 1}{3k}$ and $N_1^{(k)} = \frac{2p}{k^2}$

$$\lambda_1^{(k)} = \frac{k(k+1)(k^2+k+1)}{6p(2k+1)}$$

An example: Symmetric birth-death Markov Chain




Discour



Ave

An example: Symmetric birth-death Markov Chain



Discounted cost Let $K_\beta = -2 - (1 - \beta)/\beta p$ and $m_\beta = \cosh^{-1}(-K_\beta/2)$.

$$D_\beta^{(k)} = \frac{\sinh(km_\beta) - k \sinh(m_\beta)}{2 \sinh^2(km_\beta/2) \sinh(m_\beta)}$$


$$N_\beta^{(k)} = \frac{2\beta p \sinh^2(m_\beta/2) \cosh(km_\beta)}{\sinh^2(km_\beta/2)} - (1 - \beta)$$

$$k_\beta^* = \sup \left\{ k \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} : \frac{\sinh^2(m_\beta/2) \cosh(km_\beta)}{\sinh^2(km_\beta/2)} \geq \frac{1 + \alpha - \beta}{2\beta p} \right\}$$


Average cost $D_1^{(k)} = \frac{k^2 - 1}{3k}$ and $N_1^{(k)} = \frac{2p}{k^2}$

$$k_1^* = \left\lfloor \sqrt{\frac{2p}{\alpha}} \right\rfloor$$

An example: Symmetric birth-death Markov Chain




Discour




Ave

An example: Symmetric birth-death Markov Chain




Discour



Ave

Summary

The system model



1. Discounted setup, $\beta \in (0, 1)$

$$D_\beta(f, g) = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t d(X_t - \hat{X}_t) \right]; \quad N_\beta(f, g) = (1 - \beta) \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U_t \right]$$

2. Average cost setup, $\beta = 1$

$$D_1(f, g) = \limsup_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} d(X_t - \hat{X}_t) \right]; \quad N_1(f, g) = \limsup_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{T} \mathbb{E}_0^{(f, g)} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} U_t \right]$$

Distortion-transmission trade-off— (Chakravorty and Mahajan)



Summary

The system model

Optimization problems

Costly communication

$$\text{For any } \lambda \in \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \quad C_{\beta}^*(\lambda) = C_{\beta}(f^*, g^*; \lambda) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) + \lambda N_{\beta}(f, g)\}$$

Constrained communication

$$\text{For any } \alpha \in (0, 1), \quad D_{\beta}^*(\alpha) := \inf_{(f, g)} \{D_{\beta}(f, g) : N_{\beta}(f, g) \leq \alpha\}$$


1. Dis

$D_{\beta}(f, g)$


2. Ave

$D_1(f, g)$

Distortion-



C_{β}^* is cts, inc, and concave



D_{β}^* is cts, dec, and convex

Distortion-transmission trade-off— (Chakravorty and Mahajan)



Summary


The system model

Optimization problems

Cos

Con

Step 1 Structure of optimal strategies




Search space of strategies (f, g)


Step 2 Performance of arbitrary threshold strategies $f^{(k)}$



Step 3 Values of λ for which $f^{(k)}$ is optimal



Step 4 Distortion-transmission trade-off



1. Disc

2. Ave

Distortion-

Distortion-

Distortion-transmi

Conclusion

Analyze a fundamental trade-off in real-time communication

Conclusion

Analyze a fundamental trade-off in real-time communication

Possible generalizations (where the proposed approach may work)

- ▶ Symmetric finite sources
- ▶ Erasure channels

Conclusion

Analyze a fundamental trade-off in real-time communication

Possible generalizations (where the proposed approach may work)

- ▶ Symmetric finite sources
- ▶ Erasure channels

More realistic models (where the proposed approach will fail)

- ▶ Non-symmetric sources
- ▶ Rate constraints (affect of quantization)
- ▶ Network delays

Conclusion

Analyze a fundamental trade-off in real-time communication

Possible generalizations (where the proposed approach may work)

- ▶ Symmetric finite sources
- ▶ Erasure channels

More realistic models (where the proposed approach will fail)

- ▶ Non-symmetric sources
- ▶ Rate constraints (affect of quantization)
- ▶ Network delays

Full version to be posted on arxiv soon.